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ABSTRACT
Increasing Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards:
Voices of Male and Female Directors in the United States
Vasilia Vasiliou
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Professor Susan M. Adams, Ph.D.
Department of Management

An emerging literature highlights the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards,
its implications, and the need for more scholarship and theoretical development on board
diversity. According to this literature, to better understand the reasons behind the
persistent underrepresentation of women on boards (WOB), of particular importance is
the need to access boards directly for data, as opposed to focusing solely on human
capital, firm, and board characteristics. This dissertation research directly accesses both
male and female board directors using a qualitative interview approach and employs
grounded theory techniques to investigate (a) how and why corporate boards appoint
members, and (b) specifically how and why they appoint female members.
This work first explores the current status of WOB across the globe. It then
presents a thorough review of the relevant literature from 2009 to date that focuses on the
business case for women directors, and barriers to increasing gender diversity on
corporate boards (GDOB). Findings indicate that barriers can be classified into three key
categories, which are often interconnected: (a) Supply-side effects in the pipeline and
human capital characteristics; (b) bias and discrimination in the form of stereotypes, the
“queen bee” syndrome, and good old boy networks; and (c) institutional/cultural
characteristics, including the lack of, or inadequate, mentoring. Results also suggest the
ix

complexities associated with identifying and addressing the reasons underlying the
persistence of male-dominated boards. Along with the slow progress for WOB, these
findings suggest that researchers may need to reevaluate current methodological
approaches to investigating this problem in order to yield more effective solutions.
This dissertation research thus takes a phenomenological approach to sociology,
whereby grounded theory techniques are invoked for data collection and analysis to
investigate male and female directors’ experiences and explore the contributing factors
behind board appointment processes. Results suggest that (a) boards find candidate
directors using search firms or headhunters, and their personal or professional networks;
(b) they often have a specific description of “who they look for,” but tend to appoint a
director because they believe he/she will be a good “fit” with the rest of the board; (c)
boards appoint female directors for strategic and sociopolitical reasons; (d) women’s
contributions are important and different than men’s; and (e) boards avoid appointing
female members because of unconscious bias, stereotypes, “Good Ol’ Boy” networks,
and the “mirror effect.” Results also reveal a paradox in that even though “the corporate
world is embarrassed by how slow the progress has been [for women],” and even though
directors indicate “they want to help increase gender diversity,” they still tend to appoint
people who “look just like them.” This drives the persistent tendency of current directors
to largely ignore female candidates and appoint their male counterparts in a process that
often seems to happen subconsciously.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“Women and girls, everywhere, must have equal rights and opportunity, and be
able to live free of violence and discrimination” (United Nations, 2018). Women’s
equality and empowerment is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, and integral
to all dimensions of inclusive and sustainable development. As a UN report states, “All
the SDGs depend on the achievement of Goal 5” (United Nations, 2018) Women’s
underrepresentation in various aspects of society is not just a problem of the developing
world. Even in a society as advanced as the United States, women are still
underrepresented in politics, despite recent strides of improvement, science and
technology, as well as in corporate governance. For instance, while women currently
comprise 44.7% of the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) total employees and occupy
63.7% of these corporations’ managerial positions (Catalyst, 2020), they still remain
underrepresented at senior levels (Ely, Ibarra, & Kolb, 2011). The pace of progress,
overall, has been disappointingly slow: Women hold only 5.8% of the S&P 500 CEO
positions and 21.2% of these companies’ board seats (Catalyst, 2020).
Academics and practitioners have long followed board composition, including the
advancement of women onto corporate boards. Especially in the last decades, research
concerned with gender diversity on boards has been prolific. However, despite significant
labor market progress over the last decades and nearly 50 years of equal opportunity
policies, a wealth of data, research, and strategies designed to create opportunities for
women (Blommaert & van den Brink, 2020; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015;
Terjesen and Sealy, 2016; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009), they remain significantly
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underrepresented in high-earnings, high-status positions (Bertrand, 2014; Blommaert &
van den Brink, 2020; Flynn, Cavanagh, & Bilimoria, 2015; Rhode & Packel, 2014; RossSmith & Bridge, 2008). As many scholars have explained, the pace of progress for
women in leadership positions in corporate America has been slower than anticipated
(Adams, Flynn, & Wolfman, 2015; Ross-Smith & Bridge, 2008; Wolfman, 2007).
Literature review findings suggest that identifying and addressing the reasons
behind the persistence of male dominated boards is highly challenging and complex. The
slow pace of change and progress in this area suggests that researchers may need to
reevaluate current treatments of the problem, where more theoretical and empirical work
must inform one another. Findings also suggest the need for analyses that draw input
directly from board members, as well as further theoretical development. As Adams
(2015b) indicates, we need to move beyond quantitative measures of progress and instead
investigate process-related inequalities in order to address change resistance that may be
hindering progress. This dissertation research explicitly addresses this need to explore
how and why corporate boards1 appoint members and, in particular, how and why
corporate boards appoint female members. Unlike most prior work, this research work is
informed by direct input from male and female corporate boards using a qualitative
interview approach, complemented by grounded theory techniques for data collection,
analysis and theory building.
For the purposes of this research, I interviewed 34 (16 male and 18 female)
corporate directors in 2014-2017. Key findings suggest that, a) boards use professional
search firms as well as their networks and relationships to find candidate directors; b)

1

This research is focused on “corporate” boards, which refers to for-profit, publicly-traded company
boards.
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they often appoint a director whose description may not exactly match their original one
of the person they were looking for; c) they appoint female directors to attract female
talent, to increase gender diversity in the boardroom and to gain legitimacy; and d)
stereotypes, unconscious bias, the “mirror effect,” the “Queen Bee” syndrome and “Good
Ol’ Boy” networks keep boards from appointing female directors.
This dissertation contributes to research and practice relevant to gender diversity
on corporate boards. First, it presents a systematic review of the relevant literature from
2009 to date. This standalone piece of work represents the status quo in the field of
GDOB and identifies potential inconsistencies that may contribute to the slow progress
for women on boards. Second, while most of the gender diversity literature to date has
been descriptive (e.g. Ross-Smith & Bridge, 2008; Sealy, Singh, & Vinnicombe, 2007),
the current study invokes qualitative interview research and a grounded theory approach
to directly access the board, the so-called “black box” (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003;
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2009), and explores behavior and decision making
associated with the elusive director selection process. In doing so, the current dissertation
answers scholarly calls for more theoretical development (cf. Terjesen et al., 2009) on the
quintessential problem of females’ underrepresentation on corporate boards by exploring
the experiences of both male and female directors. By bringing in the discussion
perspectives and voices of male directors which have been largely ignored in the
literature thus far, it provides potentially interesting and important insights that could
assist researchers, organizations, as well as individuals reevaluate the appointment
process and help to better understand, for example, how their behavior might affect
women’s advancement.
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1.1. Board of Directors’ Role and Importance in the Governance of a Corporation
A board of directors is a body of elected or appointed members who act as
representatives of the shareholders and jointly oversee the activities of a corporation (cf.
Harner, 2009). Described as the “core organ of the modern corporation” (Nili, 2019:
153), boards of directors are tasked with establishing corporate management related
policies, and with making decisions on major company issues, such as mergers, dividend
and options policies, and the appointment and compensation of executives (cf.
Bainbridge, 2008). The board is a resource for management that provides advice, insight,
and access to important networks and resources (Bainbridge, 2008; Nili, 2019). Having a
board of directors is required of all public companies and the board is instrumental in a
company’s success or failure.
Since the 2008 market plunge, the case for gender diversity at the corporate top
has extended beyond that of firm performance to include issues of social justice.
Attention has been drawn to the importance of corporate governance, decision making,
values, and the goals and priorities of directors with increased scrutiny to the composition
of corporate boards (Terjesen et al., 2009). In general, there seems to be a growing
consensus within corporations and society that gender diversity on corporate boards is
important and valuable (cf. Nili, 2019).
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) suggest a four step process in the selection and
election of directors: identification, evaluation, nomination, and election. They find that
the first two steps are critical; once a candidate clears them, nomination and election are
almost guaranteed. Assuming that once a director is nominated election is nearly
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guaranteed (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), selecting a nominee for election is what the terms
“director appointment/appointing a director” refer to in the context of this research.
1.2. The status of women on corporate boards across the globe: Current numbers,
trends, and adopted legislative approaches
Gender diversity appears to be a high boardroom priority, with an impressive 46%
of the 432 independent directors newly added to S&P 500 boards over the past year being
women (Spencer Stuart, 2019). However, despite the record number of newly appointed
women directors, meaningful change in the overall composition of S&P 500 boards is
persistently slow (Spencer Stuart, 2019). While additional studies indicate important
progress for women directors over the past year, this progress, again, continues to be
slow (Emelianova & Mihomem, 2019). Catalyst reports incremental increase in female
representation among S&P 500 companies in the United States in 2020: Women currently
hold 21.2% of directorships (Catalyst, 2020), which indicates a meager 2.1% increase
since 2014 (cf. Catalyst, 2014-2016).
According to the Women on boards 2019 Progress Report, 98.7% of the MSCI
ACWI Index boards remain male-dominated (Emelianova & Milhomem, 2019). And
despite the more pronounced increase in gender diversity on boards in 2019 compared to
2018, most of the gains for women directors continue to come from markets that have
mandated regulation (Gladman & Lamb, 2013; Emelianova & Milhomem, 2019). In
markets that lack such legislation the gains are significantly less. For example, among the
constituents of the MSCI ACWI Index2 that were not required to comply with any form
of elective or compulsory gender quota, 23.0% had all-male boards. In the United States,
2

MSCI ESG Research's Women on boards 2019 Progress Report includes data as of October 31, 2019,
covering 2,765 companies, constituents of the MSCI ACWI Index (Emilianova & Milhomem, 2019).
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where board diversity advocates have emphasized investor pressure and voluntary change
over legislative mandates in most states, board diversity is increasing at a slower pace
with a 2.8% increase in the past year (26.2% in 2019, up from 23.4% in 2018 and 21.7%
in 2017) (Emelianova & Milhomem, 2019). Of the nine constituents of the MSCI World
Index with no female directors, excluding Japanese and China-based firms, five were
U.S.-domiciled (Emelianova & Mihomem, 2019).
In Brazil, women directors are an even rarer find, as they only comprise about 5%
of Brazilian directors in the GMI Ratings sample, a figure below the emerging markets
collective percentage of 7.4% (Gladman & Lamb, 2013). A bill pending in the Brazilian
Senate would impose a 40% female quota on the boards of state-owned enterprises by
2022. At this time, however, the rule would not apply to public companies that are not
state-owned. Even though the measure was first proposed in 2010, it has not been acted
on to date (Catalyst, 2014). In contrast, Australia has been more successful than many
other markets in boosting the number of women on boards. By August 2014, 18.3% of
directors on ASX 200 boards were women, up from 8.3% in 2008, according to the
Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD). The percentage has nearly tripled
from 10.7% in 2010 (Catalyst, 2020; Orsagh, 2014) (Figure 1).
-----------------------------------------------Insert FIGURE 1 about here
-----------------------------------------------In an effort to increase the representation of women in top positions in the
corporate sector, as well as decrease gender inequity in, for example, earnings, many
countries across the globe, especially in Europe, have introduced laws mandating that a
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specific number of corporate board seats be filled by women. This is one of the main
reasons Europe is currently leading the globe on gender diversity on boards. In Europe,
legal requirements for women’s representation exist or are being considered at both the
EU level and in various countries. In late 2003, Norway was the first country to pass such
a law, mandating 40% representation of each gender on the board of publicly limited
liability companies. Following Norway’s lead, countries such as Spain, Iceland, Italy,
Finland, France, and the Netherlands have all passed similar reforms. France, Sweden
and Norway currently lead the developed world in their percentage of female directors
with 44.3%, 39.6% and 39.2%, respectively (Emelianova & Milhomem, 2019).
Significant increases in women’s representation are also happening in Italy where,
following the passage of laws mandating board gender diversity, the percentage of
women on boards skyrocketed from 8.2% in 2013 to 37.1% in 2019 (Emelianova &
Milhomem, 2019). In fact, France and Italy had the highest percentage of companies
among MSCI ACWI Index constituents with more women on boards than their laws
actually require.
The idea of mandating gender quotas on corporate boards has been gaining further
political traction in Europe over the past few years (Bertrand, 2014) (Figure 2), albeit not
without controversy. In 2014, the German coalition government passed legislation
requiring that corporate boards be comprised of at least 30% women by 2016 (or else the
seat would be left vacant). In Germany, women now hold 33.3% of total director boards
seats (Emelianova & Milhomem, 2019). Even in the United States, where gender board
quotas were often deemed impossible by experts in the field, the state of California
passed a law in 2018 (Senate Bill No. 826) that required public companies whose
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principal executive offices are located in California to have at least one female director
by the end of 2019 (Greene, Intintoli, & Kahle, 2020). The law also requires that public
company boards have a minimum of two women on five-person boards, and a minimum
of three women on six(or more)-person boards by the end of 2021 (Greene, Intintoli, &
Kahle, 2020).
The state of Illinois attempted to pass a similar bill, but quota mandates were
ultimately replaced by disclosure requirements (HB 3394), whereby, no later than
January 1, 2021, all public companies headquartered in Illinois must include (gender and
minority) diversity information in their annual reports (Sherry, 2019). The law also
requires process-based disclosures, such as specific qualifications, skills, and experience
a company considers for its directors, director nominees, and executive officers, as well
as descriptions of the company’s process for identifying and evaluating director nominees
and executive officers, including whether and how demographic diversity is considered
(Sherry, 2019). Another HB 3394 requirement with potentially significant implications is
that companies describe their policies and practices for promoting diversity, equity, and
inclusion among their boards of directors and executive officers (Sherry, 2019).
Similarly, Massachusetts (SD 1529), Maryland (HB 1116/SB 911), New Jersey (S3469),
Washington (SB 5142), and New York (A 6330/S 4278) have all introduced legislation
aiming to improve the representation of women on corporate Boards (Boden, 2019;
Freedberg, 2020; Whieldon, 2019).
Despite the fact that many countries have introduced such quotas for election,
gender quotas are still a very controversial subject in public and scholarly discourse:
When big societal issues such as gender issues access the mass media, they often give
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rise to controversies and publicity regarding the accurate definition of problems, their
urgency, and appropriate solutions (Aykut, Comby, & Guillemot, 2012). Such
controversies are indicators of a competition between stakeholders over the framing of an
issue (Aykut, Comby, & Guillemot, 2012). Specific social groups are involved, through
the process of framing and agenda-setting, in the construction of facts about women’s
representation in the corporate world as public problems. Their success or failure in
closing debates results in the construction of issues as either consensual matters-of-fact or
controversial matters-of-concern (Latour, 2004).
For example, in November 2012, the European parliament voted in favor of a
proposed draft law that would require 40% female board members in about 5,000 listed
companies in the European Union by 2020. According to the proposal, state-owned
companies would be required to comply by 2018. However, a recent report by the
European parliament states that “despite broad consensus across the EU in favor of taking
measures to improve the gender balance on company boards, not all Member States
support EU-wide legislation and some Member States consider that binding measures at
the EU level are not the best way to pursue the objective” (European Parliament, 2019:
2). Countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom submitted “reasoned opinions” eight weeks after the proposal’s submission
questioning its legal validity and indicating a preference for either national measures or
non-binding measures at the E.U. level (European Parliament, 2019). In an attempt to
compromise and break the deadlock on the directive, E.U. officials have revised the
proposed target dates and reporting deadlines but agreement has not yet emerged
(European Parliament, 2019).
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Empirical studies have explored various themes surrounding quotas, such as their
diffusion, the actual decision-making process leading to quotas, the implementation
process and its effect in both quantitative and qualitative terms. As Dahlerup (2008: 323)
asserts, “Gender quotas are an important research subject, since quotas touch upon so
many central themes in feminist theory and political theory: concepts of citizenship,
representation, democracy, equality, fairness and the political meaning of sex and
gender.” For example, Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2015) outline an integrated model
of three key institutional factors –female labor market and gendered welfare state
provisions, left-leaning political government coalitions, and path-dependent policy
initiatives for gender equality– that, in their view, explain the establishment of board
gender quota legislation based on the proposition that the country's institutional
environment co-evolves with gender corporate policies.
Gopalan and Watson (2015) use agency theory and the principal-agent model to
argue for diversity disclosure measures for companies in the United States. More
specifically, they propose a model that calls for an annual shareholders binding vote whose results the companies would have an obligation to disclose on: (a) whether the
company should consider diversity in board appointments and adopt a diversity policy;
(b) if so, whether the company should impose a target quota; and (c) what steps should be
taken to achieve the objectives of the policy (p. 61). They believe that their proposal
overcomes the principal-agent gap problem by allowing shareholders to determine
whether the company should consider a diversity target.
As with other forms of affirmative action, many opponents of legislative
approaches for increasing gender diversity on boards believe that selecting members on
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the basis of demographic characteristics such as gender reinforces precisely the kind of
sex stereotyping that society should be seeking to eliminate (Rhode & Packel, 2014).
This and other arguments (for instance, that quotas may negatively impact firm
performance (e.g. Wellalage & Locke, 2013)) that appear in the public and scholarly
debate over imposing gender diversity quotas for boards in the United States, make the
implementation of such legislation at the country-level seem a far-reaching possibility, at
least in the foreseeable future.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a
comprehensive review of scholarly studies written from 2009 to date, extending the work
of Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh published in 2009. Chapter Three introduces the qualitative
interview study and describes the methodological strategy adopted to address this
dissertation’s overarching research question. Chapter Four presents detailed research
findings and Chapter Five discusses implications for research and practice, as well as
avenues for future research.
The chapter that follows reviews literature that is concerned with gender diversity
on corporate boards from 2009 to date. It focuses on scholarly work that explains the
persistent underrepresentation of women on corporate boards, and identifies reasons why
there are so few women directors on boards across the globe.
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CHAPTER TWO
2. GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS: A LITERATURE REVIEW
This analysis aims to extend the comprehensive review of Terjesen, Sealy and Val
Singh (2009) by systematically identifying literature from 2009 to date that explores (a)
women’s contributions or the relationship between women directors and firm
performance, value, or corporate social responsibility (CSR); (b) the reasons behind the
slow progress for women on corporate boards; and (c) theoretical and legislative
approaches used to examine and address women’s underrepresentation on corporate
boards.
I identified the literature through ProQuest, Behavioral Sciences Collection
databases (EBSCO), Web of Science, and Google Scholar searches. The first stage in the
study selection process involved a Web of Science search using Boolean operators and
keywords such as “gender diversity” or “women” and “corporate boards”, and “barriers
for women on boards” for the time period between January 2009 and February 2020. An
initial general search identified 788 publications. I examined the titles and abstracts of all
of these publications and omitted the ones that were beyond the scope of this research.
For example, I screened out themes that did not address the gender component in terms
of diversity and ones that were concerned with private or non-profit boards, and excluded
publications written in languages other than English. Then I conducted Google Scholar,
EBSCO, and ProQuest searches using the same parameters to identify articles that may
have been omitted from my initial database. During this second phase of the selection
process I particularly focused on articles published in management journals consistently
referenced in the seminal Terjesen et al. (2009) literature review, such as the Academy of
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Management Journal, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Journal of
Business Ethics, and Journal of Management. The study criteria resulted in 333 relevant
publications.
The sections that follow present the results of the literature review in terms of
descriptive and thematic analyses (Donnelly & Monolova, 2020; Tranfield, Denyer, &
Smart, 2003). Descriptive results provide a simple set of categories emerging from the
reviewed publications, such as year and type of publication, study regions/countries, and
popular journals. Thematic analysis results examine the core themes emerging from the
literature, as well as connections and consensus within the themes.
2.1. Descriptive Analysis Results
Of the research studies reviewed, 28.2% (94) were published in 2019 indicating
an influx of interest in the subject over the past year, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 4
indicates the journals that published three or more articles on the topic over the selected
time period. The Journal spearheading the conversation is the Journal of Business Ethics
(28), followed by Corporate Governance: An International Review (13), and Corporate
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society (13). Figure 5 shows a
word frequency map of all the articles reviewed in this section.
---------------------------------------------------------Insert FIGURES 3 and 4 and 5 about here
---------------------------------------------------------2.1.1. The role of theory in the gender diversity on boards literature to date
Terjesen et al. (2009) assert that the vast majority of academic literature on
women on corporate boards is descriptive and does not explicitly utilize or develop
13

theoretical frameworks to study the phenomenon at hand. In this analysis I find similar
results in that approximately 15% of all the papers reviewed use, or develop a theoretical
framework to explore, analyze, or explain the issue they are concerned with. Table 1
indicates the theories still in use since the comprehensive 2009 review and illustrates
publications that use each one. Some of the theories mentioned in Terjesen et al.’s (2009)
review have relatively lost traction in more recent studies (e.g. social network theory);
others continue to be utilized (e.g. institutional, agency, and gender theories). Some new
theories are adapted from other fields (e.g. signaling theory from evolutionary biology) to
study phenomena in the context of gender diversity on boards. Thematic analysis results
in the sections that follow examine these articles and their theoretical underpinnings
within the scope of this research.
-----------------------------------------------Insert TABLE 1 about here
-----------------------------------------------2.2. Thematic analysis results
There is a growing consensus within corporations and society that gender
diversity is important and valuable. Gender diversity has also increasingly been the focus
of scholars concerned with corporate boards. The articles reviewed for the purposes of
this research fall under two major categories: (a) Those that are concerned with the case
for WOB beyond the social justice case (i.e., the business case for WOB), which make up
a large majority of the articles reviewed; and (b) those that explore the reasons behind the
persistent underrepresentation for WOB. Regarding the business case for WOB,
researchers in recent years have explored the relationship between women directors and:
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(a) board effectiveness; (b) firm value, and financial and/or organizational performance;
and (c) contributions that involve corporate social responsibility issues and boardroom
dynamics. Regarding the reasons behind the persistence of male-dominated boards,
studies have attributed the situation to (a) supply-side effects; (b) bias; and (c)
organizational/institutional

characteristics

and

practices

that

inhibit

women’s

appointments to boards.
2.2.1. The Business Case for WOB
Women on Boards and Board Effectiveness
Several gender diversity scholars are concerned with women’s contribution to
board effectiveness (e.g. Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009; Martinez-Jimenez, HernandezOrtiz, & Fernandez, 2020; Nielsen & Huse, 2010). For example, Nielsen and Huse (2010)
explore whether and how women make a difference to board effectiveness in strategic
and operational control. They use a survey of 201 Norwegian firms and find that the ratio
of women directors is positively correlated with board strategic control. In particular,
they find that the positive effects of women directors on board effectiveness are mediated
through increased board development activities and decreased level of conflict. However,
they find no evidence for a positive correlation between women directors and open
debate, which is thought to enhance boards’ strategic and operational control. The authors
thus conclude that women’s contributions to boards may be attributable to their different
leadership styles: the presence of female board members seems to increase board
effectiveness through reducing the level of conflict and ensuring high quality of board
development activities (Nielsen & Huse, 2010: 136).
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Similarly, Kang, Ding, and, Charoenwong (2010) find that investors react well to
the appointment of female directors in order to increase board diversity, particularly
when women maintain or increase the board’s independence. Martinez-Jimenez,
Hernandez-Ortiz, and Fernandez (2020) explore the mediating role of board
effectiveness, measured by strategic control, organizational innovation and decisionmaking, to analyze the relationship between WOB and firm performance. Even though
they find a negative and statistically significant relationship between WOB and board
effectiveness, they assert that this negative result is because of the low number of women
on the boards in their study. They suggest that their result supports tokenism (e.g.,
Guldiken et al., 2019) and critical mass (Kanter, 1977) theories, where women are
categorized, stereotyped and ignored by the majority group (of male directors),
minimizing their influence in terms of decision making and board effectiveness.
Women on Boards and Firm Performance/Value
Much of the rhetoric around the globe surrounding gender diversity on boards
centers on the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance and/or value,
and whether and how the former impacts the latter. This review of the more recent
scholarly literature reveals that empirical findings on the issue continue to be mixed.
While some authors find a positive relationship between board (gender) diversity and
various measures of firm performance, others find a negative relationship, and still
others’ results are inconclusive.
Several research studies over the past few years indicate a negative association
between WOB and firm performance (e.g., Handa, 2019; Wellalage & Locke, 2013;
Yildiz, Meydan, Boz, & Sakal, 2019; Yang et al., 2019). For example, Wellalage and
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Locke (2013) explore the impact of board gender diversity on firm financial performance
and agency costs in Sri Lanka’s publicly listed companies. The authors apply a dynamic
panel generalized method of moments estimation and find a significant negative
relationship between the proportion of women on boards and firm value along with an
increase in company agency cost. They claim that their evidence provides insights for
governments and academic institutions in their efforts to provide resources that will help
enhance women's leadership skills in developing countries (Wellalage & Locke, 2013).
Jonson, McGuire, Rasel, and Cooper (2020) find that boards with an older average age of
directors perform better in terms of return on assets (ROA) than boards with a younger
average age. They argue that increasing the number of WOB, especially by enforcing
targets, reduces the average age of a board. Considering age as a proxy for experience,
they suggest that these boards are then more likely to produce lower financial returns
(Jonson, McGuire, Rasel, & Cooper, 2020). Similarly, Yang et al. (2019) find evidence
for a performance-reducing effect of the Norwegian gender-balancing quota, especially
for accounting-based performance measures.
In contrast, an influx of recent studies indicate a positive relationship between the
number of WOB and firm performance (e.g., Agyemang-Mintah & Schadewitz, 2019;
Bernile, Bhagwat, & Yonker, 2018; Groening, 2019; Ilanit, Einav, & Rami, 2012; Jurkus
et al., 2011; Li et al., 2018; Kim & Starks, 2016; Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, &
Laffarga, 2017). Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, & Laffarga (2017), for example,
examine the link between board gender diversity and firm financial performance in Spain
and find that compulsory legislation, which increased the number of WOB in Spanish
firms by 98%, is positively related to higher economic results. Specifically, they find that
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the increase of female representation on boards positively influences firm economic
performance. Further, Jurkus et al. (2011) find that firms with a greater percentage of
female directors exhibit lower agency costs, especially when it comes to firms in less
competitive markets. These results suggest that increasing diversity in management can
have beneficial effects for firms where strong external governance is absent. Similarly,
Sabatier (2015) finds that, in the context of French firms and accounting for endogeneity,
promoting women on boards has a significant and positive effect on firm financial
performance, reducing corporate inefficiencies and enabling firms to operate closer to
their optimal performance. Li et al. (2018) find a positive effect of gender diversity on a
firm’s performance in terms of employer/employee relationship, which is linked to
enhanced organizational performance.
Lucas-Pérez et al. (2015) investigate the relationship between gender diversity
and compensation of top managers in the Spanish context. Their findings show that
gender diversity positively affects the effectiveness of boards in terms of composition,
structure, size and functioning, and top managers’ compensation, which are then linked to
company performance. In line with Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, & Laffarga (2017),
Lucas-Pérez et al. (2015) suggest that legislative actions aimed at increasing the presence
of women on boards of directors are, thus, justified not only for ethical reasons, but also
for reasons of economic and organizational efficiency and effectiveness. For instance, as
Ilanit, Einav, and Rami’s (2012) findings suggest, firms with a higher female
representation in corporate governance and/or in top management have a higher earnings
quality. Further, having more women on corporate boards is associated with greater
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female managerial representation in the organization (Skaggs, Stainback, & Duncan,
2012).
Further, scholars explore the relationship between the percentage of women on
boards and the company’s value in terms of stock performance, return on assets, and
Tobin’s Q. For example, Carter et al. (2010) explore the relationship between board
diversity and Tobin’s Q, but find no statistical evidence that supports such a
relationship. They thus claim that appointment decisions for women directors should be
based on criteria other than future firm financial performance. Similarly, Chapple and
Humphrey (2014) take a market-level approach to compare the performance of portfolios
of firms with gender diverse boards to those with homogeneous boards. Overall, they do
not find evidence of a relationship between gender diversity on boards and performance.
Gregory-Smith, Main, and O’Reilly (2014) also find no significant link between gender
diverse boards and firm performance measures, and argue that proposals favoring board
diversity should be structured around the moral significance of diversity and equal
opportunity, rather than the expectation of improved performance (Gregory-Smith, Main,
& O’Reilly, 2014; see Fernandez-Temprano & Tejerina-Gaite, 2020; McCann &
Wheeler, 2011; Sandgren, 2012 for similar findings).
In contrast, Ilanit, Einav, and Rami (2012) find that the gender of directors has
value implications for analysts and investors, and that there is a positive relation between
the proportion of female directors and the firm's value. Similarly, Kim and Starks (2016)
show that women on boards could improve firm value because of women’s unique
contributions to the board. Specifically, they posit that women directors contribute to
boards by offering specific functional expertise that is often missing from corporate
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boards (Kim & Starks, 2016). This expertise increases board heterogeneity, which has
been positively associated in the literature with firm value (Kim & Starks, 2015). An
even more recent study by Abad, Lucas-Pérez, Minguez-Vera, and Yagüe (2017)
examines the relation between the gender diversity on boards of corporations and the
levels of information asymmetry in the stock market, and finds that female participation
on boards is negatively associated with the level of information asymmetry in the stock
market. Findings provide evidence that gender diverse boards have a positive impact on
stock markets (Abad, Lucas-Pérez, Minguez-Vera, & Yagüe, 2017). In addition, Isidro &
Sobral (2015) find that WOB are positively related with financial performance measured
in terms of return on assets and return on sales, as well as with ethical and social
compliance, which in turn are positively related with firm value. Agyemang-Mintah &
Schadewitz (2019) also show that the presence of females on the corporate boards of UK
financial institutions has a positive and statistically significant relationship with firm
value.
Joecks, Pull, and Vetter (2013) use a panel dataset of 151 German firms to
explore whether this link between women on boards and firm performance follows a Ushape. Controlling for reverse causality, they find evidence that the critical mass of three
women (an absolute number) in a boardroom is associated with higher firm performance
as compared to male boards. Similarly, Owen and Temesvary (2018) claim that there is a
non-linear, U-shaped relationship between gender diversity on boards and various
measures of bank performance, and that women on boards have a positive effect in wellcapitalized banks once a threshold level of gender diversity is achieved. In line with these
results, Vintila, Onofrei, and Gherghina (2014) find that board seats need to be filled with
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at least 22.5% women in order to positively influence firm value. Zaichkowsky (2014),
however, challenges the theory that a critical mass of (three or more) women in the
boardroom is needed to make a difference. The author shows that while public companies
in Canada that had three or more women on their boards had the highest corporate
governance scores, companies with only one woman on the board still scored
significantly higher than those with none (Zaichkowsky, 2014).
Sun, Zhu, & Ye (2015) explore whether a more gender diverse board makes better
investment decisions in the context of an economic crisis. Drawing on Austrian economic
cycle theory and work groups theory, the authors argue that such board openness will
help male board members to overcome gender biases, discrimination, and conflicts;
integrate different perspectives under the economic cycle and crisis; and foster an
environment in which better decisions are made (p. 363). They employ an empirical
investigation of 14,609 firm-quarter observations from 1,555 listed firms in China
between 2007 and 2009 and find that a Chinese board is more likely to accept female
directorship during an economic crisis than during an economic prosperity stage. They
also find that more gender diverse boards are more likely to make tough, counter-cyclical
investments to improve firm performance during a crisis. Several other studies find a
similar beneficial role of female directors in times of crisis (e.g., Chen, Leung, Song, &
Goergen, 2019; Palvia, Vahamaa, & Vahamaa, 2015; Papangkorn, Chatjuthamard,
Jiraporn, & Chueykamhang, 2019).
Along the same lines of research, Triana, Miller & Trzebiatowski (2013) integrate
threat-rigidity theory and team diversity research to examine how board gender diversity,
firm performance, and the power of women directors interact to influence the amount of
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strategic change. Results suggest a three-way interaction in that when women directors
have power, new perspectives seem to be most readily integrated when firm performance
has been high and there is a lack of threat. The authors conclude that diversity is doubleedged because it can propel or impede strategic change depending on firm performance
and the power of women directors (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013).
Women on Boards, CSR, and Boardroom Dynamics
Multiple empirical studies demonstrate that greater presence of women directors
is linked to better CSR performance within a firm’s industry (e.g., Miller & del Carmen
Triana, 2009; Zhang, Zhu, & Ding, 2013; Jia & Zhang, 2013) and enhances firm
reputation (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2013). For example, Zhang, Zhu, and Ding
(2013) explore the effect of board composition on CSR following the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Treating CSR performance as the reflection of a firm's
moral legitimacy, findings suggest that deliberate structuring of corporate boards may be
an effective approach to enhance a firm's moral legitimacy. Similarly, Jia & Zhang
(2013) explore how women directors influence corporate philanthropic disaster response;
they find that when at least three women serve on a board, their companies’ responses to
natural disasters are more significant. García-Izquierdo, Fernández-Méndez, and
Arrondo-García (2018) find that WOB positively influence the sustainable progress of
Spanish firms. Specifically, they find that women directors contribute to a moderation of
executive remuneration growth and are consequently perceived by shareholders as
valuable resources in the design of executive remuneration plans.
Several studies find that gender diverse boards are associated with higher quality
sustainability reports, particularly regarding female independent directors (Al-Shaer and
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Zaman, 2016); with respect to the critical mass of three female directors (Amorelli &
Garcia-Sanchez, 2020; Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz-Blanco, 2014); with respect to
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures in emerging markets (Issa &
Fang, 2019; Orazalin, 2019; Wasiuzzaman & Mohammad, 2019); and when audit
committees are more gender diverse (Bravo & Reguera-Alvarado, 2019). Similarly,
Wahid’s (2019) findings suggest that firms with gender diverse boards commit fewer
financial reporting mistakes and engage in less fraud due to a change in boardroom
dynamics. Li et al.’s (2017) findings highlight importance of gender diversity in
developing good firm environmental policy as well improving corporate governance.
They assert that the more likely firms in a given industry are to cause environmental
pollution, the more salient female directors’ positive impact will be on firms’
environmental policy (Li et al., 2017).
Mathisen, Ogaard, and Mamburg (2013) investigate how female directors
experience boardroom dynamics using a sample of 491 directors from 149 boards. More
specifically, they explored the extent to which female directors experience less justice,
lower cohesion, and higher levels of conflicts within the board than their male
counterparts do. Findings revealed generally few differences in the way female and male
directors experienced boardroom dynamics, concluding that there are reasons to believe
that female directors are welcomed into boardrooms, not perceived as outgroups, and
boards are able to benefit from female directors' experience and skills. The section that
follows challenges these findings by examining the reasons behind the persistent
underrepresentation of WOB within the scope of this literature review.
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2.2.2. Reasons behind the Persistent Underrepresentation of Women on
Corporate Boards
Given the growing support for gender diversity on corporate boards, why is the
pace of progress still slow? Literature review findings may highlight a simple
explanation: Research on the impact of WOB on firm/organizational performance may be
too mixed to make diversity a priority, and so many corporations may not think of GDOB
as a business imperative (Rhode & Packel, 2014). However, there are alternative
explanations identified in this review, which I argue to be more critical. These can be
classified into three key categories, which are often interconnected: (a) Supply-side
effects in the pipeline, human capital characteristics; (b) bias and discrimination in the
form of stereotypes, queen bee syndrome, and good old boy networks; (c)
institutional/cultural characteristics, including the lack of, or inadequate, mentoring.
Supply-side effects and women’s role in their own career advancement
A common response to explain the dearth of female board members and CEOs is
that too few qualified women are present in the traditional pipeline to board service
(Rhode & Packel, 2014). This absence is often attributed to the fact that many women
drop out of the workforce when they have children, and that afterwards, they either delay
return or never return at all (Sandgren, 2012). According to this perspective, the women’s
choice of labor market activity, human capital investment and consequent career path,
result in a relatively limited pool of qualified female candidates when board positions are
filled. This is in contrast with the notion of the “glass ceiling” (Powell & Butterfield,
1994) which argues that there are discriminatory barriers that prevent or inhibit women’s
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advancement. Both views suggest, however, that qualified applicants for filling up board
positions are predominantly male.
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that indicates that women are attracted to
board roles (Braund, 2011). Braund looks at Australian data that shows that there are
more than 10,500 people registered with Women on Boards, of which 3,000 are highly
active in the network. However, she explains that while many women say they want to do
board work “to give back to the community,” they are vague about the value they can add
and the kind of organizations they want to target. This lack of clear goals can give rise to
a tendency for women to undersell themselves and, consequently, pitch their aspirations
lower than their skills and experiences merit. She further states that while a desire to
contribute is admirable, it may not necessarily serve the interests of the individual or the
organization in the long term: becoming a not-for-profit director can potentially close
doors for those ultimately seeking director roles on corporate boards. She believes that a
better strategy for women who have had a high-level career is to seek a directorship on a
more business-focused board in the private, public-listed or government sectors before
taking a position on a quality, not-for-profit board, which would ensure against becoming
branded in a not-for-profit space.
Braund (2011) asserts that “while many women eligible for directorships are not
adept at self-promotion for higher level board positions for often social and complex
reasons, the role of search firms, consultants and male directors in the selection and
nomination process for boards is critical to their success” (Braund, 2011: 5). Studies have
shown that women are less power-oriented (Adams & Funk, 2012) and less powerhungry than men (Schuh, Hernandez-Bark, Van Quaquebeke, Hossiep, Frieg, & Van
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Dick, 2014). In line with this research, Rowley, Lee, and Lan (2015) use signaling theory
(see Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011) to argue that barriers to the progress for
women on the road to directorships include poor “signaling” of success for female
directors. However, the authors also cite structural issues coming from networks and
nomination process bias, role model and mentor shortages, work-family balance, legal
ambiguity, policies, and cognitive behavior. In their recent review of the GDOB
literature, Gabaldon, De Anca, Mateos de Cabo, and Gimeno (2016) comment further on
gender roles, gender self-schema, and work-family conflict as barriers to women’s
directorships. Other scholars add to the list of barriers the non-transparent and “unclear”
appointment process (Kalyan & Sindhu, 2014). These and other barriers are explored in
the sections that follow.
Gender bias and how it relates to the slow pace of progress for WOB
Heemskerk, Eelke, & Fennema (2014) assert that the recent inclusion of women
in the corporate elite is the result of an abrupt change in recruitment practices, and they
consider female presence in corporate boards as a sign of the democratization of elite
social networks. However, many gender diversity scholars cite discrimination and bias in
the form of stereotypes, the queen bee syndrome and good old boy networks to explain
women’s persistent underrepresentation in leadership positions. For example, women’s
legitimacy as directors is often challenged by resistant males (Singh, Point, Moulin, &
Davila, 2015). Fogliasso and Scales (2011) describe how stereotypes created by society
and the business environment, and discrimination in the areas of promotion,
compensation and training, and in the form of “good old boy” networks that exclude
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women from membership in key informal social systems that expand throughout
organizations (see Oakley, 2000) inhibit women’s career advancement.
Knippen, Shen, & Zhu (2019) directly contrast Mathisen, Ogaard, and Mamburg
(2013)’s conclusions (as described in the earlier section of this chapter: “Women on
Boards, CSR, and Boardroom Dynamics”) and find that incumbent male directors are
more likely to treat the new female directors as outgroup members. They argue that due
to gender biases firms are more likely to add WOB through additions of board seats
rather than substitution of male directors. Knippen, Shen, & Zhu (2019) also find that
new female directors added through addition of board seats are less likely to serve on
major board committees than those who are added by replacing male directors. Their
findings suggest that external pressure has a positive but limited effect on countering the
gender bias on corporate boards toward female directors (Knippen, Shen, & Zhu; 2019).
Along the same lines of research, Gregory-Smith, Main, and O’Reilly (2014) use
UK, FTSE350 data from 1996 to 2011 to examine issues regarding the
underrepresentation of women on boards. They find evidence of gender bias in the
appointment of women as non-executive directors, as well as evidence of discrimination
in wages or fees paid. The authors assert, however, that the fact that the representation of
women on company boards is far lower than their presence in the labor market would
suggest does not necessarily prove discrimination. The outcome may be due to supplyside effects arising from considerations such as family formation (Mincer & Polachek,
1974; Bygren & Ghler, 2012). However, using Farrell and Hersch’s (2005) test of
discrimination, which examines whether the gender of the appointee depends on the
gender of the departing director –which would point to discrimination– Gregory-Smith,
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Main, and O’Reilly’s (2014) findings indicate that the board appointment process
displays a gender-bias in the selection of non-executive directors. That is, the probability
of a director position going to a woman depends on whether a woman has stepped down
from the board in the recent period, which leads the authors to conclude that the
appointment process for non-executive directors is not gender neutral (Gregory-Smith,
Main, & O’Reilly’s, 2014).
Tinsley, Wade, Main, and O’Reilly (2017) make almost identical conclusions
based on their own study findings. Specifically, they examine a dataset of more than
3,000 U.S. public firms and find that a female is most likely to be appointed to a
corporate board when a woman has just exited the position. They find an analogous
tendency to reappoint a male director when a man leaves. The authors argue that this
“gender-matching heuristic” can impede progress in attaining gender diversity, regardless
of intention, because it emphasizes the replacement of existing women rather than
changing board composition (Tinsley, Wade, Main, & O’Reilly, 2017).
Similarly, de Cabo & Gimeno’s (2017) and Reutzel and Belsito’s (2015) findings
suggest bias against females in the boardroom (see also Goyal, Kakabase, & Kakabase,
2017; Gregorič, Oxelheim, Randøy, & Thomsen, 2017). Reutzel and Belsito’s (2015)
study focuses on panel data from U.S. companies in the years 1997-2007 and examines
the effect of the presence of female directors on organizational outcomes in initial public
offering (IPO) firms. The authors find that whereas U.S. IPO investors react negatively to
female presence on boards, the effect is weakened post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The authors
explain that the fact that this bias appears to be mitigated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may
imply an increasing awareness of female director contributions to board functioning on
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the part of IPO investors. De Cabo & Gimeno conduct an event study on 257 mergers and
acquisition (M&A) deals and find that female directors have a lower probability of being
appointed after an M&A, which is consistent with biases in the recruitment of female
directors. This effect remains significant after controlling for professional characteristics
and major committee service.
Elsesser and Lever (2011) use role congruity theory (see Eagly & Karau, 2002;
Schein, 1975) to explain the persistence of gender bias against female leaders, and more
specifically, the discrepancy between the traditional female gender roles, such as
communal roles including nurturing, caring, and sensitivity, and the leadership role,
which are more frequently associated with male gender roles. Role congruity theory
predicts that female leaders suffer from two types of prejudice because of this conflict:
descriptive (i.e. from stereotypes) and prescriptive, which involve evaluations (Eagly &
Karau, 2002; Johnson et al., 2008). Their empirical findings, show minimal evidence of
prescriptive bias, but a high level of descriptive bias, where women are viewed as having
less potential for management (Elsesser & Lever, 2011).
Hodigere and Bilimoria (2015) analyze the human capital and professional
networks of 494 male and female corporate outside (non-executive) directors appointed
between 2005 and 2010 to S&P 500 U.S. public company boards. They find that,
compared to their male counterparts - appointed at the same time for the same boards female directors’ human capital and professional network characteristics did not as fully
explain their appointment. While men appear to be appropriately selected to join
corporate boards on the basis of their individual human capital quality and professional
network characteristics, women appear to be appointed to corporate boards more on the
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basis of their gender than the quality of their individual characteristics. The authors assert
that this is likely due to regulatory, legislative and public relations pressures felt by
corporate boards to diversify. This finding suggests that sex typing continues to prevail in
the selection of candidate directors, since being a woman appears to significantly
overshadow individual qualifications in women’s appointment to corporate boards
(Hodigere & Bilimoria, 2015).
According to a 2011 survey by Women Corporate Directors, Heidrick &
Struggles, and Harvard Business School, while women cite male-oriented networks as the
number one reason to explain why female representation on boards is not higher, men
cite a lack of female executives at the top of corporations (Larcker, 2013). However,
using multivariate analytical techniques and data from Spanish firms, Larcker (2013)
finds a positive association between the female share of the board of directors in the
previous year and the female share among current top executives. This pattern of women
helping women at the highest levels of firm leadership highlights the continued
importance of a demand-side “glass ceiling” in explaining the slow progress of women in
business (Matsa & Miller, 2011; Handa & Singh, 2015) and indicates that the two
phenomena may ultimately be inextricably linked. A different strand of research
counteracts these results and challenges the notion that women in high-level positions
will advocate for other women as potential work-group peers, asserting that females in
high-prestige work groups often face special challenges in fulfilling this role and will
abdicate the opportunity to support highly or moderately qualified female candidates as
potential work-group peers. Duguid (2011) conducts three experiments and finds support
for this phenomenon, often identified as the “queen bee syndrome” (Kanter, 1977).
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Organizational/institutional characteristics and practices that inhibit women’s
appointments to boards
Another strand of organizational research on the causes of women’s persistent
underrepresentation in leadership positions has shifted away from a focus on, for
example, deliberate forms of discrimination and actors’ intentional efforts to exclude
women, to consider the so-called second-generation forms of gender bias (Ely, Ibarra, &
Kolb, 2011), the powerful yet often invisible barriers to women’s advancement that arise
from cultural beliefs about gender, as well as workplace structures, practices, and patterns
of interaction that inadvertently favor men (Adams, 2018; Leung & Adams, 2018; Calás
& Smircich, 2009; Ely & Meyerson, 2000; Kolb & McGinn, 2009; Sturn, 2001).
For example, embedded in the legacy of historically male-dominated industries,
many companies may not realize their biases in favor of men (Sandgren, 2012). This
discrimination may often be informal, unintentional, and “behind the scenes” (Kanter,
2010). Traditional methods of, for instance, networking, coaching, or mentoring, which
were developed when corporate management was almost entirely male, may not
necessarily work for women (Sandgren, 2012). McDonald and Westphald (2013) develop
a conceptual framework that suggests how disadvantages in the receipt of mentoring
regarding prevailing norms in the corporate elite negatively affect the ability of women
and minorities to secure multiple board appointments. Their theory describes how women
(and minority) first-time directors receive lower levels of mentoring, which result in them
receiving relatively fewer appointments to other boards. They relate this phenomenon to
social psychological research on intergroup relations theory, and more specifically,
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intergroup biases, and conclude that such lower levels of mentoring negatively impact
diversity on corporate boards.
In line with this research, Sabatier (2015) indicates that gender diversity on
boards depends on firms' attributes, such as gender promotion strategies. Carrasco et al.,
(2015) aim to explore the reasons behind the overall relatively low proportion of women
on boards and the slow pace at which more women are being appointed, as well as
reasons behind the varying proportion of women on corporate boards across countries.
They use institutional theory to hypothesize and test whether this variation can be
attributed to differences in cultural settings across countries. Their analysis reveals that
two cultural characteristics are associated with the observed differences across countries.
More specifically, they find that countries which have the greatest tolerance for
inequalities in the distribution of power and those that tend to value the role of men
generally exhibit a lower representation of women on boards.
Grosvold (2011) adopts institutional theory and a nested approach to explore the
national-, industry-, and firm-level institutional characteristics that influence gender
diversity on boards. Empirical findings indicate that Scott’s (1995) regulative, normative,
and cultural-cognitive pillars influence the appointment of women directors (Grosvold,
2011). More specifically, Grosvold’s analysis shows that countries that are politically and
culturally liberal and give women access to education and political influence, and where
religion is less widespread, have more women on boards. She finds that whereas industry
dynamics and trade union density do not have an impact on women’s board
appointments, boards comprised of younger members and firms that used the nomination
committee had more women directors, especially when the committee included female
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members. Compton, Kang, and Zhu (2014) investigate whether female board
representation depends on the location of the company in conservative “red” states
(which tend to vote for Republican candidates) or in liberal “blue” states (which tend to
vote for Democratic candidates). Similar to Grosvold (2011) these authors find that
female board representation is consistently lower for firms headquartered in red states
than for those headquartered in blue states, after controlling for major covariates that
include industry, size, and availability of female labor force (Compton, Kang, & Zhu,
2014).
Finally, Adams, Flynn, and Wolfman (2015) cite organizational culture and, more
specifically, four key reasons for the persistence of all-male boards: (a) the process by
which boards bring on new members; (b) the historical preference for current or former
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) for directors; (c) the endurance of entrenched boards;
and (d) the attitudes of management and the board that determine the culture of the
organization (p. 1).
2.3. Strategies to increase gender diversity on corporate boards
As the literature review demonstrates, increasing gender diversity on corporate
boards poses great challenges, especially in the United States where nation-wide
mandated quotas for women are unlikely, at least for the near future. According to the
literature, strategies to counteract the dynamics that keep holding women back and
increase board diversity fall into two main categories. The first category focuses on
increasing and highlighting individual female director’s capacity for service. The second
involves societal, governmental and gender diversity activist group (i.e., organizations
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such as The Boston Club, 2020WOB) strategies to encourage corporations make
voluntary efforts to enhance diversity.
The sections that follow describe these two categories, focusing on factors,
concepts and theories that may be useful in terms of progress for WOB, and explore
approaches that are being used in different countries around the globe that could
potentially be useful for the United States.
2.3.1. Strategies for Enhancing Individuals’ Careers: a Focus on Networking
and Mentoring Practices
As Rhode and Packel (2014) assert, an evident way to expand the number of
women on corporate boards is to help increase the pool of qualified applicants. Formal
mentoring programs, leadership workshops, diversity advisors or coaches, and sponsors
can assist female talent shape their career paths, refine and enhance their resumes,
develop networking strategies, overcome barriers to self-promotion (Rhode et al., 2014)
and, in the case of sponsors for example, be their champions when opportunities for
promotion arise. In countries such as France, Canada, UK, and Australia there appears to
be a prevalence of such mentoring and networking programs in recent years that are
geared towards increasing women’s representation on boards (Maitland, 2008; Rhode &
Packel, 2014). For instance, Hazen and Broome (2012) document Australia’s success in
educating aspiring female directors and then pairing them with mentors who are
corporate board chairs and pledge to help place them on a board, after they have assisted
them in their careers for a year. In the US, many private groups collaborate with
advocacy groups and universities to pursue strategies of establishing and expanding
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female director networks and providing mentors to aspiring board members (Rhode &
Packel, 2014).
Nevertheless, as the literature review testifies, many researchers identify mentor
shortages for women, which they claim significantly inhibit their appointment onto
boards (e.g. McDonald & Westphal, 2013; Rowley, Lee, & Lan, 2015). Further, others
argue that traditional methods of, for example, networking, coaching, or mentoring,
which were developed when corporate management was almost entirely male, may not
necessarily work for women (Sandgren, 2012). As Ibarra, Carter, and Silva (2010: 80)
explain, “high-potential females need more than just well-meaning mentors.” As many
studies suggest, increasing quality mentoring from experienced directors for women
increases their chances for promotion (e.g. McDonald & Westphal, 2013; Sandberg,
2012). For example, McDonald and Westphal (2013) suggest that incumbent members of
the corporate elite (who are predominantly white males), who hold several board
appointments and serve on a board with a particular first-time director, play a significant
role in helping first-time directors secure appointments to other boards.
Similarity-attraction theory (Byrne, 1971) and the homophily principle (Ibarra,
1992; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987) posit that individuals prefer to interact with
demographically similar others. The tenets of similarity-attraction theory and the
homophily principle are consistent with optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991),
which also suggests that individuals prefer to associate with similar others. According to
optimal distinctiveness theory, this need for assimilation is heightened when individuals
feel too distinct or individuated because they are vulnerable to isolation and even
stigmatization (Duguid, 2011). Mentors or sponsors with board experience themselves
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may therefore be critical in bringing qualified candidate directors to the attention of
nominating committees.
Such experienced directors usually have substantial influence in their networks
and on the boards they serve, and can help introduce and promote a novice director as
part of the in-group (i.e. similar to them in demographic dimensions such as gender
(Hewstone, Hantzi, & Johnston, 1991; Hewstone, Rubin , & Willis, 2002)). This can have
a huge positive impact on a women’s career advancement (e.g. overcoming
(unconscious) biases and discrimination as per the literature review above); in short, they
take up the role of a sponsor for the novice director. McDonald and Westphal (2013)
explain that first-time directors should try to meet prevailing expectations among
experienced directors who are in a position to help their directorial career to the extent
that they (a) actively involve themselves in discussion of issues raised by the CEO; but
(b) do so in normatively acceptable ways in which their involvement recognizes the
preeminence of firm management, and especially the CEO, in strategy formulation (p.
1172). They introduce the notion of “participation process mentoring” where an
experienced director can guide a novice one regarding normatively acceptable norms of
outside director involvement in board deliberations (McDonald & Westphal, 2013).
Social psychological literature on intergroup relations indicates that incumbent
directors, the overwhelming majority of whom as we have previously shown are white
males, provide comparatively more mentoring regarding participating norms to male and
white first-time directors (McDonald & Westphal, 2013). Consequently, women (and
minority) first-time directors are often disadvantaged in the amount of mentoring they
receive, especially regarding guidance on important participating norms. Relevant social
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psychological research suggests that the key underlying drivers of this effect are white
male incumbent directors’ tendencies to categorize (a) first-time directors who are white
males as in-group members; and (b) women and minority directors as out-group
members. McDonald and Westphal’s (2013) empirical findings confirm the expectations
that, because they receive less mentoring regarding normative ways of participating in
board deliberations, women first-time directors receive fewer additional board
appointments (p. 1187).
2.3.2. Societal, Legal, and Advocacy Group Strategies
In the United States, many organizations and national campaigns are dedicated to
advancing women to important and visible leadership roles across corporate America, as
well as to help placing them on corporate boards, such as The Boston Club,
InterOrganization Network, Women Corporate Directors (WCD), and 2020 Women on
Boards. Such organizations also seem to apply pressure on corporations and hold them
accountable for decisions involving gender diversity on their boards by conducting and
publishing comprehensive research on their gender diversity status (e.g. see 2020WOB
Annual Gender Diversity Index Report; The Boston Club Annual Census). These
organizations’ efforts and comprehensive analyses are an effective way to “encourage”
companies to voluntarily disclose statistics and efforts related to increasing their board
gender diversity. As in Illinois, government legislation that would require companies
operating in the United States to disclose information about their corporate governance,
and be more transparent in their appointment process might also be effective in
increasing GDOB (Sherry, 2019). This strategy holds companies and their leaders
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accountable to their shareholders and stakeholders and reinforces awareness and the
thinking necessary for increasing gender diversity on corporate boards.
2.4. Summary
The above analysis provides a review of the literature that indicates the status of
women on corporate boards across the globe and explains the persistent
underrepresentation of women on corporate boards. This includes a summary and critique
of theoretical and legislative approaches used, and strategies that may be useful in
counteracting the dynamics that hold women back. Regarding legislation, results suggest
that mandated regulation has been effective in increasing board membership around the
globe. At the same time however, mandating gender quotas on corporate boards remains
a controversial subject, and appears to have spurred a new area of research.
Another strand of the literature examines the effect of women on board
effectiveness and firm financial performance, but results continue to be mixed, and thus
inconclusive, despite an influx in recent studies that indicate a positive impact of WOB
on firm performance. In light of the mixed results, some researchers have proposed
framing the gender diversity debate as one of moral value. Perhaps more important may
be the strand of research that concerns itself with explaining the lack of women at the
corporate top. Well-known outcomes of this literature include a low supply of qualified
women, but also, and perhaps more importantly, gender biases that lead to negative
demand-side effects. Results from this literature suggest that a “perfect storm” of factors
may be converging and leading to the persistence of male dominated boards.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. VOICES OF MALE AND FEMALE DIRECTORS: A QUALITATIVE
INTERVIEW STUDY
As literature review findings indicate, despite an increasing amount of evidence
for the potential benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards, women continue to be
disadvantaged and underrepresented when it comes to corporate board appointments. The
research study that follows aims to explore the experiences of both male and female
directors and understand board appointment processes and behaviors that affect females’
representation on corporate boards. This chapter describes the methodological strategy
adopted for the purposes of this study and presents a detail account of the qualitative
interview results. Chapter 4 discusses connections to the literature and implications for
research and practice.
3.1. METHODOLOGY
In order to better understand what regulates behavior and drives the board
appointment process, I interviewed individuals directly involved in such processes. This
methodology is influenced by phenomenological approaches to sociology (Schutz, 1967;
Weber, 1993). As Forte, Larco and Bruckman (2009: 53) assert, “understanding a social
space involves gaining access to the experiences and interpretations of people who live in
that world.” Since this study seeks to explore the contributing factors behind board
appointment processes, it is particularly important to understand how male and female
directors qualitatively interpret their experiences of being appointed and serving on
corporate boards.
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Qualitative research allows the development of data that describe a social
phenomenon, including an understanding of the people and events that pertain to it
(Lincoln & Guba 1985; Miles & Huberman 1994; Patton 1990). Phenomenological
methods for investigating social spaces include interviewing: Qualitative interviews are a
useful strategy when the phenomena of interest – in this case, how corporate boards
appoint directors and why they appoint (or avoid appointing) female directors – cannot be
clearly distilled from the social and organizational context in which they occur (Myers,
2013). Therefore, I employ a qualitative interview study to guide data collection and
analysis and help answer this study’s research questions, as they require an extensive and
in-depth description of a contemporary social phenomenon.3 As Rubin and Rubin (2005:
vii) explain, qualitative interviews are like night goggles, “permitting us to see that which
is not ordinarily on view and examine that which is looked at but seldom seen.” It is,
thus, appropriate to use a qualitative interview study method, because it will help shed
light on these “mysterious,” “secret” or sometimes even “sacred” board decision-making
processes as they relate to appointing new members and, in particular, female ones.
Grounded theory allows for the development of a general explanation, model, or
theory, shaped by the views of participants who are familiar with the phenomena (Corbin
& Strauss 2014; Strauss & Corbin 1997). It is an appropriate approach for inquiry when
there is a need for a theory to explain how people are conceptualizing and experiencing a
phenomenon, and existing theories are either unavailable or lacking sufficient detail
(Creswell, 2007). Even though existing research has provided important insights on the
board appointment process, the underrepresentation of women on boards is still

3

The term contemporary social phenomenon entails studying the present without excluding the recent past,
for which people involved can be interviewed (Yin, 2014).
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persistent, the pace of progress embarrassingly slow, and the perspectives of male
directors are largely absent in the literature. This provides fertile ground for innovative
theory building in this domain. Grounded theory enables the harnessing of respondent
perspectives to articulate a theoretical exposition of behaviors and attitudes of male and
female directors in appointing additional members, and allows the uncovering of new,
emergent themes pertinent to the board appointment process (cf. Johnson & Sohi, 2015).
Further, grounded theory allows for the incorporation of the perspectives and insights
provided by respondents, while maintaining a meticulous qualitative analysis (Stake,
2010).
Corporate boards in the United States typically have a nominating or governance
committee tasked to identify appropriate candidates for board seats. Their work and the
decision-making process of the full board to nominate candidates are behind closed doors
and are not public information. This makes examining board decisions or operations
particularly difficult since boards are highly sensitive to public scrutiny; such processes
may often have critical implications, not just for a company’s success or failure but also
for society in general (Vasiliou & Adams, 2018). For example, the market plunge of
2008, along with the demise of some financial institutions and the utter failure of others,
such as Lehman Brothers, inevitably drew attention to the importance of corporate
governance and brought scrutiny to the composition of corporate boards of directors
(Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Obtaining direct access to processes and decisions in
terms of discussing such issues with board members is, therefore, challenging and the
confidentiality concerns associated with that are high. Investigating sensitive information,
such as decisions to appoint (female) directors, could potentially be viewed with scrutiny
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and skepticism within the participant’s professional network. This has three major
implications for this study: First, there are implications in recruiting participants, because
finding an “insider,” a current director willing to talk about these issues is challenging.
Second, there are implications in identifying the unit of analysis because a participant
with multiple board experiences may not explicitly identify and distinguish each one
during the interview. Finally, there are implications associated with the inherent risk of
reporting such findings which often include sensitive and confidential information.
Below I elaborate on these implications as they relate to data collection and analysis.
3.1.1. Sample Selection, Participant Characteristics and the Interview Process
For the purposes of this study, I conducted interviews with 34 corporate directors
(16 male and 18 female) that mainly serve on corporate boards in the United States. I
selected the sample by adopting a theoretical sampling strategy. Theoretical sampling is
useful in qualitative examinations as it involves selecting participants with intimate and
extensive knowledge pertinent to the research questions (Strauss & Corbin, 1987). I
restricted the interviews to participants who had direct with experiences with being
appointed onto corporate boards, and had been involved in the recruitment of other
directors in some way. Obtaining direct access to boards’ decision making processes is
critical for examining this study’s research questions, but at the same time highly
challenging, as described above. I used purposeful and chain referral sampling strategies
to recruit directors (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981) (see Appendix A for the electronic
recruitment letter sent to potential participants). Participation was voluntary and no
incentives were provided to participate.
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In the period between 2014 and 2017, I conducted in-depth interviews aiming for
theoretical saturation, which yielded interviews with 16 male and 18 female directors.
Saturation occurs when no new categories or properties surface from the gathering of
additional data (Creswell, 2007). Figures 6 and 7 include participant demographic
information in terms of gender and age. The respondents are business experts, financial
experts, academics, and lawyers, holding at least a bachelor’s degree (8 BS/BA, 20
MS/MA/MBA/JD, 6 PhD). They have a collective experience on approximately 185
boards4 in the United States, in industries such as technology, manufacturing, services,
financial, retail and consumer goods, energy, technology, health-care, and life sciences.
Figure 8 indicates a breakdown of participants’ education by gender.
-----------------------------------------------Insert FIGURES 6, 7, and 8 about here
-----------------------------------------------Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, with each of the participants. Five
were conducted in person and 29 by telephone, for participant convenience. I used a
semi-structured and evolving interview protocol (Myers, 2013), where I pre-formulated
questions and topics for discussion guided by prior literature. Questions in the semistructured protocol need to be strictly adhered to and allow for flexibility to inquire and
probe participants’ responses, which is especially useful when trying to understand
complex realities and processes (Hux, 2017; Myers, 2013). I audiotaped 29 of the
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Data regarding the participants’ collective number of boards was compiled from sources such as
participant CVs, BoardEX, online company profiles, and SEC filings. Data was cross-referenced between
these sources, when possible. The number is reported as an approximation, because a few participants selfreported ambiguous information in their CVs and distinct memberships could not be cross-referenced. For
example, one participant indicated memberships on “several” boards. For those cases, numbers were
calculated based on publicly available information and reported as an approximation.
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interviews. For the remaining five, following some participants’ requests, I relied on
notes taken during the interview.
The interview guide, developed using prior literature and adapted as the
interviews progressed, consists of open-ended questions about directors’ experiences,
specifically as they relate to gender diversity on corporate boards, facilitators and barriers
to advancement, leadership, and perceptions of differences between male and female
directors (Table 2). I began each interview by asking participants to describe some of
their board experiences and, more specifically, how they were initially appointed as
directors. This chronological narrative provided a structure to the interview (Mazmanian,
Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013), but as participants recounted and reflected on their board
experiences, I encouraged elaborations and digressions on boards’ choices, actions,
decisions and outcomes. As the interview progressed, I asked more specific but openended questions pertaining to the study’s objectives. For example, one of the questions
was “How do you believe female and male directors differ?” to explore reasons why
boards may appoint (or avoid appointing) female directors and why males have been
traditionally preferred for such positions. To encourage unbiased and candid responses, I
avoided leading questions and reassured participants that all responses are anonymous
and held in strict confidence within the research team (Hux, 2017; Cohen et al., 2007).
-----------------------------------------------Insert TABLE 2 about here
-----------------------------------------------A large majority of the directors interviewed have had multiple board
experiences. For example, many of the female participants had experiences that ranged
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from being the only woman on a board, to being a director on a board with additional
female members, which helps to provide varied perspectives towards the objective of this
study. Further, the majority of participants had multifaceted board experiences: both as
directors who have been appointed on multiple boards and as ones who had directly been
involved in processes of appointing others. Their experiences, hence, provide a rich
characterization of the appointment process with which to examine this study’s research
questions.
3.1.2. Coding and Analytic Strategy
After deleting all identifying information, I coded and organized transcribed data
using NVivo 11 software. Following grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss,
1967, 2009; 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 1990) and thematic coding (Boyatzis, 1998)
procedures, I coded the transcribed interviews using a systematic, sequential, and
rigorous approach (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). I cycled through multiple readings and
coding of the interview transcript to identify patterns and themes as they emerged from
the data. Analyzing the interview transcripts, I particularly search for evidence relevant to
my research questions, including words and phrases.
Coding progressed from refining analytic categories to aggregating quotes along
main themes in order to paint a clear picture of respondents’ experiences as they relate to
this study. This allowed the identification of key analytic categories, such as “what
boards look for in a director,” “how boards use search firms (to find a new director)” or
“why boards appoint female directors.” Observing inconsistencies in the board
appointment process regarding how directors talked about appointing new members
versus how and why they actually did, led me to look more closely at how directors

45

explain their motivations and rationale behind appointing new members and, in
particular, female ones. What emerges from this analytic strategy is a better
understanding of how these processes and decisions materialize, and the consequences
and tensions of these actions (Vasiliou & Adams, 2018). Finally, I reviewed and refined
the codes within categories.
Two additional raters (an expert in qualitative research and an expert in the field
of research this study is concerned with) examined sample transcripts and their coding
during the initial stages of the process. In cases of disagreement, the raters and I
discussed them until agreement for main codes was reached. The research field expert
also reviewed the finalized coding scheme and data associated with each code. Although
there is no standard for interrater agreement in qualitative research, the “80–90 % range
seems a minimal benchmark to those most concerned with an evidentiary statistic”
(Saldana 2012, p. 28). In this study, the raters reached more than 90% inter-rater
agreement on the development of the codes. This coding process and theme development
is supported by several qualitative research experts (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Miles &
Huberman 1994; Saldana, 2012). This process further improves analytic rigor by
validating data interpretations (Azmat & Rentschler, 2017).
A detailed description of findings follows in the sections below. The sample
quotations illustrate themes stated repeatedly. The Bentley Institutional Review Board
has approved this study (see Appendix B for the informed consent letter sent to
participants).
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3.2. RESULTS
The directors I interviewed for this study have extensive first-hand experience of
the implications and underlying drivers of gender diversity on corporate boards. They are
all business professionals that hold high-level, high-status positions and whose board
experiences shed light on this study’s research questions. A large majority of the
participants have served on more than two distinct boards throughout their careers, have
chaired committees on several of them and have had experiences as both candidate
directors, as well as directors involved in the appointment of others (in the interest of
confidentiality5 none of the boards they have been directors on will be identified, as
explained above). Their formal training ranges from legal to accounting, business,
physics, and economics studies. Their average age is 68.2 (65.6 for female and 71.1 for
male participants). First, I organize the discussion of results according to the two major
aspects of the overarching research question: (a) How boards appoint directors; and (b)
Why they appoint (female) directors. Then, I use the literature review conducted in this
dissertation as a guide to organize some important additional results. When quoting
participants, I use “Resp” for respondent followed by an identification number from 1 to
34, which was randomly assigned, and denote their gender by M for male or F for female.
In the section that follows I draw data from their experiences to describe how Boards6
appoint directors.

5
6

The confidentiality issue as it relates to this study and discussed earlier in the Methods section.
The term “Boards” refers to the corporate boards the respondents have been members of.
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3.2.1. How Boards Appoint Directors: Data from Respondents’ Board
Experiences
The process of appointing directors on boards is one that is often veiled and not
explicitly discussed by board members outside their board room. As a female director
attests, the appointment process “is one of those kinds of mysterious things that some of
the groups like women, corporate directors and other groups are trying to formalize and
make some of this a little bit more readily available for women without it being a
mysterious, secret process.” Attempting to uncover this mysterious process in exploring
how Boards appoint new members, I found that they use search firms to help them find
potential candidates based on descriptions of the people they look for, but they also
perform their own inquiry through relationships with people from their network. Findings
indicate that Boards often appointed not whom they had initially described, but someone
whom they believed to be a good “cultural fit” with the board.
Who Boards look for
The search for potential candidates for most job positions almost always starts
with a conscious, and sometimes non-conscious, portrayal of the person “best suited” for
it. Prior research indicates, as discussed earlier, that this is often based on either
educational and professional attributes, such as having a PhD degree and teaching
experience for university professors, or personal traits, such as leadership skills for a
manager, or a combination of such qualities. Board searches for a new director start with
a similar pattern, as a female director notes: “We want a very high-level person in the
financial services sector...someone who will be a good colleague to work with...and
someone whose skills and capabilities would be an addition to the board’s talent pool”
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(Resp2, F) As a female director’s board recruitment experience indicates, Boards often
look for directors who have acquired traits in their careers that are missing from (and are
wanted or needed on) their board: “I think you will be a great board member because we
don’t have your suite of capabilities on our board” (Resp3, F).
An important criterion in selecting candidates is making sure that they are willing
to dedicate significant time to being a director. This is important not only for the
company’s operations, but also for the shareholders’ views of and trust in the company.
For example, as a female director describes, “Serving on a board of directors you
absolutely have to have the flexibility to attend all the meetings...it is almost holy grail
that you don’t skip meetings...(and) your shareholders look askance if you are not able to
attend at least 75% of meetings every year...” (Resp2, F). This often leads to Boards
searching for people with past board experiences who are, therefore, conscious and aware
of what is expected and required of them and have “proved” in general that they can, and
are willing to, do the job: “They tend to look for folks who are already on other
boards...once you are on a corporate board it becomes easier to get that second or third
corporate board and (that) makes you a prime candidate for subsequent boards; you have
proved yourself” (Resp1, F). Data further suggest that the criteria for appointing directors
on Boards are often perceptions of one’s self and may thus be intangible and difficult to
articulate. For example, a female director observed how members “tend to look for folks
who look just like them”7 and characterized that as “the mirror effect” (Resp2, F). These
criteria are especially significant for female candidates for reasons that will be discussed
later in this study.8

7
8

Emphasis added by author
The mirror effect is explored in detail in the “Barriers to female director selection” section that follows.
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Findings also indicate that “cultural fit” is of utmost importance for current
members looking to bring new ones among their midst. Illustrative respondent quotes
below highlight how “cultural fit” is sometimes more important than job experience,
educational background and skillset in selecting a director:
Many times [directors] will say they want someone who looks like X and what
they really want is someone who will fit in with their background in one way or another
and is someone who will be a good colleague to work with. What they are really looking
for is someone who will culturally be a match for what they are trying to do in the
boardroom (Resp2, F).
Who are you from a cultural standpoint or a personality standpoint or are
we going to spend all of our time discussing the whys and wherefores of
what we are doing. Or worst case scenario some personality issues that
can be destructive for the board. It is like any hiring experience, resume,
background, can you do the job, would you fit in here, would this be
disruptive to the organization or additive to the organization. (Resp11, M)
One of the things that is very important in a boardroom and with board
experience is the fit of individuals. This would be my experience, having a
director who has the right fit for the existing board members, assuming
they bring the type of credentials and experience that’s necessary. Then
having someone who fits well with existing board members. A head hunter
may do a search and bring a number of candidates and then that person
will be interviewed by other members of the committee, then that is when
the fit will be determined. (Resp7, F)
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Fit, Skills and Experience
Also, to add specific skillsets and experience on the board was crucial for Boards.
As a female director states, she was specifically approached for one of her directorships
because the board was “...interested in government contracting...and they didn’t have
anyone on their board who understood ways that [town] works.” Specifically, a Boards
director approached her and expressed an interest in having her on their board, because
they sought to have her capabilities on board; specifically, he said “I think you’d make a
great board member because we don’t have your suite of capabilities on our board”
(Resp2, F). Similar respondent statements follow below:
When we’re looking to add board members, we are looking for people
with complementary experience or complementary skills to ones always
represented on the board. You may start with a matrix, what type of
experience would be additive to the board? You can determine what that
person is, looks like on paper at least, but it is how that person,
determining how they interact with other members of the board. In my
experience, is that we have very active open discussions, so having
somebody who fits well into that environment is important in order to
make sure that the functioning of the board continues to be very positive,
functional (Resp7, F).
I also brought in another guy as a director, who subsequently became an
employee. This guy had sales and marketing experience which was
another missing element on the board. This guy who I knew he worked for
me at {company name}. He became a director and they liked him so much
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they subsequently offered him the job of vice president of sales of
marketing and he did that for a while... Generally, there is a discussion
among the board members of what they want to see in a director. It
usually does not involve a gender selection. It involves an experience
profile. (Resp17, M)
The (board) invitations have been there because of experiences and a need
that the board sees. I’m not sure it always in practice happens that way, it
is the experience I’ve had and that other board members have had. At
least in my experience it’s what we need to see or would like to see in the
next director coming on board. What are the needs that we have, what do
we think will drive the company forward what kind of help can we expect
and can we look for in a new board member?(Resp11, M)
My experience sitting on boards and talking about, I can’t recall a
conversation about gender diversity on the board to be quite honest with
you. That is the four boards I have been hanging around with most
recently. Searching my brain...I can’t remember a discussion saying boy,
we need to change the complex of the board here and bring more gender
diversity on the board. On our own company board, we have two females.
They weren’t chosen because they are female, they were chosen because
they were the best athletes. To us it was not there are too many men in the
room, it was, who is the best talent? Let’s bring them on the board! I am
thinking of (some of my) other company boards; everyone has females on
them and I can’t ever remember anyone saying they need to recruit them
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to make the board more diverse. It was always because they brought talent
and business acumen to the organization. (Resp16, M)
Multiple respondents indicated that being a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
sometime in their career was helpful in terms of being selected as directors:
My first exposure being a director was really when I accepted the job offer
to become president and CEO of [company]...A company that is a for
profit organization, you know, the assumption is that if you have a woman
on the board, she was selected, because she has specific experience
perhaps, you know, is working for a lawyer for a large firm or has been a
chief financial officer for a firm, or has been a CEO running an operating
company. (Resp17, M)
I was asked if I wanted to be a director I was the CEO of a public
company, this was a financial company, I checked it out and decided I
would. (Resp27, M)
You are seeing some countries that are starting to mandate some ratio of
women on boards. I don’t see that happening here. I still think it is going
to be a very slow process. I don’t know what’s going to happen what
makes it change. What you are seeing now, in the last few years, is even
though it is very small, is that more and more women are becoming CEOs
of very large corporations. That is still pretty miniscule, but it is
happening. And those women are probably being inundated about
opportunities to sit on boards. But what is now happening more and more,
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if you are CEO of a public company your board probably won’t let you sit
on more than one board because board service has become much more
demanding than it used to be. (Resp13, M)
I think this is the dilemma of gender diversity on board, is if it comes down
to gender diversity in the United States in top corporate management,
because a lot of the board members... are recruited from the top
management of the companies. And so if you have only 10%, I don't know
what the number is, but if you only have 10% of the top management of
significant companies who are women, then you have much more limited
pool to recruit from than if you had 50% of the top management that were
women in the corporate world. (Also,) I think it's challenging because
there still aren't that many women at the executive level reporting to
CEOs. I mean, it's the same issue. If only 4.5% of Fortune 500 companies'
CEOs are women, it would be interesting to look at the next level down of
management to see what percentage of those are women, because that's
where the next CEOs are gonna come from, is the next level down. So you
can almost predict the percentage of women that will be CEOs of Fortune
500 companies ten years from now that will be CEOs of Fortune 500
companies if you could compute the percentage of women in the top
management jobs reporting to CEOs in these companies. (Resp4, M)
Well, I think part of the problem is the typical request is for a particular
role – somebody who has been a CEO, somebody who has been a CFO,
somebody who has been a senior partner in an accounting firm – and so,
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what happens are there are fewer women in those roles and the search
firm, rather than saying here’s some women who have those skills and
capabilities but haven’t had the opportunity, they go to the role definition
rather than looking more broadly. (Resp34, F)
After the Boards establish a description of “who they look for,” they often turn to
professional search firms in pursuit of the best candidates for the job.
How Boards use search firms/headhunters
A female director described several instances where Boards used a professional
search firm to find candidate directors. She highlighted that “corporate boards very often
use search firms to find their directors” and described them as “big companies that do
searches for corporations” (Resp2, F). For example, when Boards were looking for a new
director with experience in financial services they communicated that to a search firm
that then went on to assemble a candidate pool accordingly. The search firm incorporated
not only the Boards’ description of who they were looking for, but also some of their own
thinking to select the people they believed to be the best candidates for the firm. As the
same respondent describes,
[Search firms] tend to look for people who already have experience and they also
tend to “loosen” what the description is for the next director; if someone says “we want a
very high- level person in the financial services sector,” [the search firm is going to] look
for people from the banking industry who are at very high levels and/or somebody who
has already served on a financial services company board, as long as it is not a conflict
[for the company] (Resp2, F).
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Additional evidence of this “loosening up” of the description is clearly illustrated
through a female director’s recent board experiences, where instructions given to the
search firm explicitly indicated that the boards she was a member of were focused on
appointing a female director. Specifically, according to a female director, instructions
given to the search firm were as follows:
We are looking for a board member now, and we calculatedly told our search
firm to please focus on women candidates who have held C-Suite level positions in
companies that wouldn’t be a conflict for us (Resp5, F).
Despite these explicit instructions, according to a female director, the search firm
“also provide(d) us with male candidates...” (Resp5, F). Several other participants echo
this sentiment. As another female participant describes:
I think search firms are significantly...conservative and play safe when
putting together slates. So, unless a company says, you know, we require
that 40 percent of the slate be women of equal quality, the search firm
won’t do it. (Resp34, F)
The fact that Boards seem to often indicate a desire to select female directors
while search firms appear to “loosen up” the ideal candidate’s description has potential
implications for gender diversity on corporate boards discussed in the next chapter.
How Boards use relationships and networks
Even though search firms appear often in the data as part of the director selection
process, relationships appear to be more important in finding and selecting candidates.
The importance of relationships in the appointment of directors, and in particular female
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directors, is evidenced by many examples (associated with relationships and networking)
that surfaced throughout the interviews. i.e.:
1) Serendipity: A male and a female director describe, for example, how their board
appointments happened almost by chance and how their network played an
instrumental role in that:
I’ve been a director on four boards and it happened almost by serendipity.
I am always asked, “What does it take to get on a corporate board?” and
I find that it’s very hard to explain. Because most of the women that I
know got...onto their first boards and subsequent boards the same way
that lots of things happen in the business world, which is because of who
you know, the contacts that you have, relationships, the networking that
you’ve done. Someone thinks of you when a position opens up, as opposed
to any kind of a formal way you might hear about. (Resp2, F)
The factor that has impacted my career the most? Chance. Why am I on
the board of a bank? Because I am a founder of a bank. Why am I a
founder of a bank? Because I said “I'm in!” It wasn't that I tripped across
it, but I was open to it (when a person I know was looking for investors). I
like people, meeting people, I like face-to-face meetings, it enriches my
life. (Resp12, M)
Luck, you know, sometimes you find yourself in situations that are actually
conducive to what you want to do and sometimes just the opposite, and
you need to find a few of those at least in order to progress and perform
and succeed. (Resp32, M)
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You know, I didn’t want the job at [healthcare industry company]. I got a
call from a search firm, and I remember at the time saying to my assistant
for the past 35 years, I said, I don’t know if I’m going on this interview, I
don’t know why anyone in health care would be interested in me and I
went and I met the people and I liked them but they interviewed me for so
long I felt I’d earned this job. So you know, I think back if I hadn’t taken
that job and I almost didn’t, like it would be very, very different today
about what I would achieve in a career and financially. And part of that
was luck. (Resp20, F)
2) Networks. Being recommended by someone who has personal experience with
you and knows your capabilities:
If you’ve had experience with someone from another board you can speak
about their attributes, from an actual experience base, so you can, you can
bring sort of credible recommendations to the table (Resp5, F).
Over the years I developed a good relationship with my boss [female
name], so when she retired she called me and said that she would be
retiring. My boss was the only woman on a board of six at the time, and
then asked me if I would consider being on that company’s board. (Resp1,
F)
I was recommended by a couple of colleagues from other companies,
competitor companies when I was at [company], whom I had grown to
know and respect and they put my name up a couple of times. (Resp5, F)
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It was done – even though they were using a search firm – it was still
through somebody who knew somebody, but I wasn’t a friend of any board
member. I had simply been working as a consultant to the company which
is not that unusual. (Resp34, F)
People at that point in your career, people are looking for people they
know, trust and with a great track record, true for men and women;
different kinds of networks, fundamental human behavior... typically
having somebody know the person is very helpful...It comes back to: how
do we get our networks to be more diverse. A mistake that women make is
that they spend so much time in their families; they don’t invest the time to
build their networks. Networking and reputation matter a lot. (Resp22,
F)
Overall, the search process is flawed; you meet with a search exec who
professes to really help people “break in;” everybody wants you to be a
member of the club that is hard to get in. Our goal is to expand the view of
the board to viable candidates. What happens to very few execs, you all go
to the names you know or names of CEOs you know; very hard to get
someone whose name is unknown. The system is biased in terms of friends
of friends...The search firms are basically lazy, they have the same pool of
candidates, and then it becomes, does anybody have a friend...so this
eliminates a formal process...and friends of friends are driving the
decision process. (Resp24, F)
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[Female name] said “I think you would be a great addition to the board”
and that was kind of it: Three months later I was voted onto the board of
directors and there I was. And I’ve been always been really independent
of her on the board. Once I was on the board I was able to build my own
relationships with people on the board. That is how I ended up there,
because [female name] brought me in. I think that is almost how everyone
else ended up there. It was almost a network like thing, there never was a
public “Oh, we are looking for directors.” It was more like “We have an
opening does anybody know anybody?” (Resp8, F)
If you decide not to use, for instance, an executive search firm, simply go
out on your own and find directors, you save a fee of course, which is high
for those executive search firms, then you develop a list of criterion that
you want in a director. Do you want a man, do you want a woman, do you
want a diversity candidate? Do you want someone with specific knowledge
and, uh, of a particular subject? For example, do you want someone with
knowledge of auto parts business or the construction industry? Or
whatever, to augment whatever you have on your board. You network and
find names of people who fit that criteria. (Resp27, M)
You have to network. Getting somebody who says, yes I know, she is okay,
she will be fine. Or he. You really have to network whether it is the
National Association of Corporate Directors, or with a financial group, if
you’re in finance...so you are interacting all the time with people who
serve on boards. You might come to mind when they are looking for
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someone. Or someone might say I am really thinking of putting [female
name] on the board, you know her right, what do you think? You really
have to get yourself out there. That’s got to be part of the process.
(Resp10, F)
I think networking is critical...You are invited to the board in a sense.
Different from the job interview process but not much, is that you may
never know there is a board opening unless someone recommends you for
it. It is not like a job posting where they post for board members. So, it is
important to have inside information and inside contacts so people will
put your name forward. I think it is important for women to continue to
add to the number of board seats, their network has to get bigger and
better and more women at the top, being at the C-level, CEO, chairman
level, obviously, maybe not obviously, who I would expect would bring
more women to boards. (Resp11, M)
The people at the [company] asked who he recommended and it was me,
and they interviewed me, I think if I didn’t have that personal introduction,
I probably wouldn’t have ever asked to be on corporate boards. (Resp9,
F)

3) Establishing and cultivating relationships with mentors and sponsors:
Women need more than mentors. Mentors are great for advice and
counselling about your career development, but women need what men
have always had in the corporate world, which is sponsors. Sponsors are
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different than mentors although you can be a mentor and a sponsor at the
same time. Sponsors are people in a significantly high enough position in
a company, or other organization, to help you map out a plan for your
own career and are in a position to actually help you get a promotion that
you might deserve or take the opportunity to go into a different position
within a company [that is, being promoted]. So, sponsors are people who
not only can give you great advice but they can also actually look out for
you and be helpful in your career planning and the execution of your
career plans...I had a great mentor, [male name], who was an awesome
mentor to me, and a sponsor. He took me out of one position and put me in
one that had more power. It was an awesome thing; he thought I had the
potential to do it...He was a sponsor and a mentor and [when she was
having doubts about whether she could do it] he said “of course you can
do it, and I’m putting you on the job!” (Resp2, F)
What were the things that helped me in my career? I mean I would say I
had a couple of really great mentors in my life. (Resp16, M)
I had men who thought that I had value to add to the organization and
were my mentors and my advocates. Men. I had women as well, but I had
men in power, CEOs, executive groups, who were comfortable with what I
brought to the table and encouraged me and put me in stretch positions
which, frankly I actually turned a couple down and they talked me into
taking [them]... I had men who saw in me the talent that I have and it was
when I was much younger, and they nurtured it and they gave me
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opportunities and stretch assignments and let me make mistakes and fix
them, and were tolerant and patient and all the good stuff. (Resp5, F)
The above examples provide ample evidence of the influential role of
relationships and networks in the director selection process. Data demonstrates how some
of the respondents believe they were appointed to Boards “almost by serendipity” and the
instrumental role their networks and relationships played in their selections. Data also
shows how establishing and cultivating relationships with people in senior positions, i.e.
sponsors, who were willing to advocate for them, was also extremely significant for their
careers.
Through participants’ experiences, data often indicates the clash of the two
director recruitment methods discussed in the findings above: Search firms and
relationships. The following narrative describes a female director’s first board
appointment that highlights the common inconsistency between the “ideal” candidate’s
profile (in this case the description that Boards gave their search firm) and actual director
selection. That is, there appears to be a disconnect between who the firm says they look
for, and who they actually appoint. Further, it provides evidence that this disconnect is, at
least partly, due to the crucial role of relationships and networks that seem to act as a
filter in the director selection process (Figure 10):
I got on that board because a guy I knew [who was already a director on
that board]...called me and said they were looking for their first woman
director, that [they] were interested in government contracting, that they
didn’t have anyone on their board who understood ways that [town]
works, and I had spent many years as a [job] [there] in an earlier life I
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was...in [town] when I got this appointment. The irony of this is that the
[search firm], which is an organization in [town] that tries to help get
women on corporate boards, and my [colleague, female name], who was
at the same firm as I was at the time [and a member of the search
firm]...The company had notified them they were looking for a woman
director and the CEO had said they were looking for someone who was an
expert in finance and I am not an expert in finance, I have no financial
background, so the [search firm] didn’t think to suggest me, so imagine
[my colleague’s] surprise when I let her know that I’d gotten this position
on the board! She said “But that’s not the description of the person they
were looking for!” which can be a problem for women seeking these
appointments (Resp2, F).
-----------------------------------------------Insert FIGURE 10 about here
-----------------------------------------------The above sections illustrate data from participants’ experiences that address the
“how” aspect of directors’ appointment on boards. In short, data shows how Boards
identify the desired qualities and skills they seek in potential candidates, how they use
search firms in various instances to find directors, as well as overwhelming evidence
pointing to the critical role of networks and relationships in the director selection process.
I now turn to findings that address the “why” aspect of this study’s overarching research
question: Why do boards appoint (female) directors and, in particular, why do “these”
Boards appoint female directors?
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3.2.2. Why Boards Appoint Directors: Data from Respondents’ Board
Experiences
As the earlier literature review indicates, previous studies suggest various
potential reasons why boards appoint female directors. These include strategic reasons,
i.e. to attract female talent in various levels of the organization, or to have diverse
perspectives and skillsets in their pool of directors; and for political reasons, i.e. to
achieve legitimacy and/or “check off the box for diversity.” Research also addresses
potential reasons why boards avoid appointing female directors. Examples include
stereotypes, discrimination, entrenched boards, “Good Ol’ Boy” networks that are more
comfortable with male than female members, and unconscious bias. Is there evidence that
Boards appoint or avoid appointing female directors due to any of these reasons?
Boards appoint female directors for strategic reasons: to attract female talent
and to increase diversity in the boardroom
Evidence from interviewees’ board experiences indicate that many of the reasons
why Boards appoint female directors are strategic. Such reasons include: (a) to attract and
retain female talent; and (b) to increase gender diversity in the boardroom. Each of these
is described below.
Attracting and retaining female talent. The first strategic reason discussed above
includes attracting and retaining female talent in the organization. As a female director
noted, “It was considered important for them to have a woman who was seen as respected
throughout the organization for having a role on the board of directors” (Resp2, F). Not
only was it “important” for Boards to have a female example in the highest ranks of the
organization, but they also wanted and encouraged her to speak to employees in the lower
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ranks and express her views in the boardroom, despite her initial reservations originating
from being a novice director. For example, this female director goes on to note how the
company called on her regularly to speak to the women in the organization and that
“...though I was intimidated to speak up initially, what I found was that everyone wanted
me to, they wanted my voice to be heard and that I think encouraged me to be more
courageous in expressing my views.”
Findings also reveal the symbolic strength of having a female director for female
employees in the company, as respondents describe below:
I think that’s yet another reason in the list of reasons why it’s so important
for women to be in the boardroom...because, make no mistake about it,
women in the company, and men too, but women in the company that you
are serving and in the broader public see you as a member, Wall Street,
the analysts, the shareholders, they see your face as a director, and, it’s a
powerful thing to be in terms of symbolism, it’s both the reality of the role
you are playing,

which is much more than symbolism, but there’s

incredible symbolism of being on a board as a woman, because it
encourages everyone around you to see that as normal (Resp2, F).
They actually had me come to an annual employee dinner where
something like 400 of the employees came and they introduced me as their
first woman director. And people kept coming up and saying hello, and
they were so happy I was there, and a lot of them were women who
worked there. (Resp10, F)

66

The notion of having a diverse organization infiltrates across all the
layers in the organization because that is just so important to have an
organization where they attract those people and that they have where
everybody can truly be themselves. (Resp31, F)
And then most of those boards didn’t have people from so-called minority
groups, so it eliminated another chunk of the talent base for the company,
and that holds true, obviously, for governance as well as management and
employment in general. So, I think as a lot of companies have faced
increasingly competitive market places, they’ve recognize that they’ve got
to compete aggressively for the very best talent, whatever gender and hue
and background they have to exhibit. (Resp32, M)
The above findings show how Boards value having female members in terms of
encouraging, retaining and inspiring employees at all levels of the organization and
female ones, in particular. In what follows I present evidence that indicate Boards’ boardlevel gender diversity awareness and level of significance, and the reasons behind some
of their decisions to diversify their board in terms of gender.
Steel magnolias on board and deep-level diversity: Differences between male
and female directors. Another strategic reason why Boards appoint female directors is to
increase diversity in the boardroom both in terms of “tangible” qualities, such as skillsets
and career background, and “intangible” ones, such as views and opinions. For instance,
some individuals believe that women have more “qualitative” skills and are more
“sensitive” to certain issues, such as the environment and society in general. For example,
a female director noted how adding a third woman on Boards “...was a great
67

differentiator and added a great deal to the diversity and the perspective of the board” and
how they are specifically interested in appointing female directors to reap the benefits of
diverse views in the boardroom:
...so we are working to change the appearance, if you will, the reality of
our board in a concentrated way, by specifically looking for folks who will
add that diverse perspective in the boardroom. (Resp2, F)
Data also indicate that it was important for Boards to diversify opinions in the
boardroom by adding more women because, as a female director asserts, “...women bring
a more qualitative element to the discussion...” When asked to elaborate what she meant
and, in particular, how she believes male and female directors differ in that regard, the
director indicated how she believes that females are often more sensitive to societal
impacts that the boards’ decisions may have. Also, she noted that female directors tend to
be more “people-focused” and actively seek to develop talent in the organization, as well
as encourage community engagement and environmental responsibility (cf. Resp2, F
quote below). A large majority of the participants agree with that perspective. They also
assert that women directors ask “the tough” questions, they are more invested in director
education, and they are more diligent and prepared for meetings. Selected illustrative
quotes are found below:
I can point to all female directors, myself included, we are way more
diligent, more invested in director education, playing by the book, and
step back and reflect, am I adding value? I don’t know a “lazy female
director” but I know lazy male directors...Female directors that I know
are more willing to stick their necks out and say I disagree, or I don’t
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know that, that’s correct, or play the board on its own effectiveness...we
are more likely to be critical of our own performance...of the female
directors that I know, we feel the need to step up and call something out.
(Resp24, F)
I think that women are more willing and able to admit that they have
questions. Women tend to be more vocal about things they don’t
understand or things that need better clarity. That said, women don’t
speak up until they feel a level of comfort on the board because they don’t
want to be seen as ignorant. Men just don’t want to be seen as ignorant
and they are less likely to raise questions or push back. I think women are
much more active board members than men. Men are much more status
quo-focused board members. So, you know, from my own experience, and
I’ve chaired a number of compensation committees, when there are
questions about CEO compensation or when the CEO makes a
recommendation for something that just doesn’t make sense, I think male
directors tend to keep quiet about their concerns and female directors are
more likely to raise their hands and say what’s going on? They are much
more likely to take the risk. (Resp34, F)
I think having female directors maybe increases the level of professional
tone. I think about the informal part of being a director. At most of our
board meetings, you have these board dinners, so, you’re in a small bus or
a car and, you know, you’re going someplace with other directors and the
female women directors will be asking about your wife and kids and I
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would say tend to have maybe a different level of conversation than male
directors. A lot of male directors have either no interest in that or it
doesn’t seem to come up, so, you know, it’s a very interesting question. I
would say it’s more in the informal interaction. And also, I suspect that
female directors probably have cleaned up a lot of board meetings. And I
never, although I like rude jokes, I never use profanity, but I’ve been
around a lot of directors that do. (Resp26, M)
Sometimes it was annoying, I would say, sometimes they would make jokes
that were... Sometimes I do not think they would belong really to a board
discussion. The jokes men make on other women, and their own you know
…after all experiences, sometimes they would forget I was there, and
sometimes they would say things not appropriate. Sometimes they would
fight, sometimes they would get angry. That is the other thing, women
bring more civility in board meetings...[How did that make you feel?]
When they acted like that? I thought they were jerks. This is supposed to
be an important meeting, you know. Here they were speaking about
inappropriate things or having a fight among themselves. Maybe they
liked it that way...To explore these worlds and release tensions, maybe,
and they can’t do that when they have women there. So, maybe they think
these women are a pain. But in general, having more women means more
civility in the board, being more to the point, not wasting, you know, time
in discussion that has nothing to do with the company, more efficiency. I
always had a fairly strict agenda, I had so many hours I wanted them to
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pay attention, I would give them their bathroom breaks every two hours,
so they would not leave when they wanted. Before it was very
disorganized. (Resp5, F)
I still think that women are much more attuned to the issues of soliciting
staff opinion and staff reaction to changes to training programs to
promotions than are men. I think there is a sense of fairness in the way
that the directors approach thinking about the work more than male
directors. (Resp33, M)
I have been blessed by serving with some of the finest women directors in
the country, these are women who are professionals, who take their board
membership seriously, do their homework for meetings and provide just
terrific input to the board process. I think, generally, what I’ve found is
most of the women on the boards I’ve served with, everybody has to do
their homework, so everybody does [but] I find that the level of
preparation with women directors exceeds those of the men. Now I don’t
know why that is it is but it is just an observation that I’ve had. For
instance, I’ll give you an example...when you approve the minutes of
previous meetings, we all read the minutes but I find that the women come
up with specific examples of things happening in the minutes: They will
say, in the third paragraph these words probably don’t make sense. That
is,, important detail that most of the men don’t come up with, for some
reason – don’t ask me why. Maybe they spend more time, women. I have
served with, oh, a dozen women directors in my career, and I find that, I
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enjoy them because I always know that, or always believe, they will come
up with things I might have missed. (Resp27, M)
I think that if you want to make generalizations; women and men tend to
think a little differently. That doesn’t mean all women think differently and
all men think differently. I think there is a different experience, different
background, different sensitivities between men and women. If a woman
has the business acumen there is a perspective that I think, as a consumer,
women think differently to men. As you can tell when you go to department
stores, if you think of men sitting in the chair while their wife goes
shopping. And women are learning to speak up... If you can make a broad
generalization, men tend to think in terms of things. Women tend to think
in terms of people. And so, there is a much more human approach on the
part of women generally, than on the part of men. (Resp13, M)
Men tend to be more focused on the quantitative side of the business as
opposed to the culture...we tend to be a little more people-focused...we ask
the good questions about what are we doing to develop talent in the
company, to really bring talented employees along, to develop them...I
think we bring to the table a huge focus on community engagement, we
want companies to be about people and the planet, not just about
profitable bottom lines...We bring a progressive way of thinking about
how companies can be seen and be in truth positive influences in every
community they operate in and that it’s up to the companies to take on that
responsibility, I think we encourage that level of civic engagement in ways
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that guys might not to the same extent. [For example], environmental
sustainability, I think we push these kinds of things that over time have
been demonstrated to not only be the right things to do, but also again are
helpful to the company in raising a positive reputation and actually
enhancing a company’s bottom line (Resp2, F).
The respondent above was careful to explain that while that may be true, it does
not mean that females are not interested in the business side of things, in the company
being profitable or that males are not interested in social issues or the benefit of society;
what females and males may differ in is the “degree” that they do:
That’s not to say that we are not about the company’s bottom line, about
the quantitative things too and that the guys aren’t also about doing well
while also doing social good, I think we are all in it for the same things,
that’s more a matter of degree, and so I think we just elevate to the top of
the priority list some of the things that guys may consider softer skills as
opposed to hard skills. (Resp2, F)
In fact, the interview data indicate that qualities, such as negotiating skills, that
are most important for such crucial business settings such as a company’s board, are
often more referenced by female members than their male counterparts. For example, a
female director indicates:
We [female board members] have a way of engaging that’s sometimes
more engaging, we tend to be the negotiators...I was never a litigator, I
was always a negotiator and that I don’t like the fights, and sometimes
guys kinda like to “duke it out” in the boardroom...I think that the whole
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conversation changes when women are there, because there’s a greater
degree of still stating your case, but being a little more diplomatic and
polite about it. And in fact, I think women, having this style of
engagement in the boardroom helps people hear the discussion that’s on
the table, as opposed to a couple of people getting angry in their debate
the more you can state it in an objective, diplomatic way the better it’s
heard.9 (Resp2, F)
Several participants, both male and female, echo this perspective, as the quotes
below indicate:
There are different interests, [women] may be more interested in the
qualitative aspects of running the company. They may be more, better
negotiators too, more open to balancing the plusses and minuses, not
rushing into a decision. Men tend to be more impulsive. Very often men
are the head of companies or departments are fairly aggressive. They have
strong egos and so they tend to brush away problems, criticisms… Maybe
women show more empathy toward them. You know, I think it’s hard to be
a CEO of a company, it is very hard, and they may not always get the
support, the mental support or the praise from male board members but
they will from women board members. Like when I see my CEO doing a
good job, I will praise him in front of everybody...It happened a few
months ago...I was the only one who praised him for a good job. And he
came to me and he said thank you, no one else did it. So, it came from a

9

Emphasis added by author
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woman. I don’t think it is a coincidence. I don’t think men are…It is not
manly to show a soft side. (Resp5, F)
I think there is actually a difference between the way men and women
approach business. The male directors that I see can be more aggressive
with the management sometimes, and more demanding, and that’s not
always good. I think women directors tend to be more open to considering
a lot of different alternatives and try to weigh a lot of different aspects to
the decision, which brings a balance to the board. I see that the difference,
the diversity, is healthy. (Resp4, M)
A female director clarifies that women having “softer” skills does not mean that
they are passive or that they allow others to take advantage of them. In fact, she views
herself and is viewed by others as a “steel magnolia;” a strong but gentle person who
does not need to be anyone other than herself for her voice to be heard in the boardroom.
Specifically, she states:
[Having softer skills is] very different than saying that we are soft, we are
not soft, soft skills should never be confused with being soft...I’m from the
[West] and we have an expression called “being a steel magnolia,” and I
think that’s how I see myself, I’ve been described by others that way, as a
steel magnolia, sort of... [an] iron fist in a velvet glove, which I don’t
know if that’s right or not, but that’s probably true (Resp2, F).
As shown earlier, relationships play an important part in the appointment process
of Boards directors. These relationships play a critical role in explaining why Boards
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appoint female directors as well: Through interactions of Boards’ directors with female
candidates the aforementioned “cultural fit” found significant in the appointment process,
is identified, assessed, and taken into consideration when looking for a (female)
candidate. For example, for her first board appointment a female director was approached
by people in her network who were already directors on Boards and who knew her
personality and character. The male director who approached her indicated how they
were looking for their first woman director and that she would be perfect for the job, not
just because of her background and skills, but because she would “culturally be a match
to what Boards were trying to do in the boardroom” and “...would be a good colleague to
work with...” This is evidence that the decision to appoint a female director often
transcends gender: It is a strategic decision motivated by finding an individual that is a
good “cultural fit” with the current board that is believed to be in the company’s best
interest.
The evidence above indicates reasons why Boards strategically pursued and
appointed female directors: To connect with, motivate and inspire employees and
especially female talent in all ranks of the corporate ladder; to diversify boardroom
skillsets, backgrounds and opinions; and to make sure that new recruits would be a good
“fit” with the rest of the board members. In the next section I present evidence, or the
lack thereof, of political reasons why Boards appointed female directors such as
legitimacy and tokenism.
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Boards appoint female directors for political reasons: Is there evidence of
legitimacy or tokenism?
Public sentiment calls for diversity in, and in particular equal opportunity to,
groups historically excluded from positions of power (Rhode & Packel, 2014). This call
has put pressure on corporations to add women on their boards (Rhode & Packel, 2014).
This “legitimacy” may provide a theoretical rationale for having women on boards.
“Tokenism” is when boards have one “female seat” in the boardroom, chronically filled
by one or various women, and show no intention of adding more. Are gaining legitimacy
or tokenism two of the main reasons why Boards appoint female directors? Qualitative
research data indicates some evidence for both legitimacy and tokenism.
Evidence regarding selecting female members as “tokens” or to “check-off the
box” for diversity are more prominent in respondents’ earlier accounts of their careers.
Further, even though some Boards valued board-level gender diversity and pursued it,
several directors’ experiences indicate potential evidence of appointing female directors
for gaining legitimacy. The examples that follow illustrate these arguments. More
specifically, they indicate tokenism, at least in directors’ earlier careers, and legitimacy
reasons for appointing female directors. Perhaps not surprisingly, some coincide with one
of the strategic reasons indicated above: To attract female talent. Illustrative participant
quotes are found below.
A guy I knew called me and said they were looking for their first woman
director. I was their first woman member of the board; what I also found
was that the company called on me regularly to speak with the women in
the company and others, including both men and women, because it was
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considered important for them to have a woman who was seen as
respected throughout in the organization for having a role in the board of
directors. Though I was intimidated to speak up initially, what I found was
that everyone wanted me to, they wanted my voice to be heard. (Resp2, F)
They have a group of people trying to help people in poor communities.
They just assume, let’s put [my name] there. Or whenever there was
something social or something related to gender or something related to
employees, oh we have to put [my name] there. (Resp5, F)
I was asked by this particular board to help recruit capable females for
this particular institution. It wasn’t me determining the words. It was
them. So, what they were looking for was, gender diversity on a board that
had become a little bit too pale and male, if you would, and so at their
request they asked me to help find some folks. They had kind of in their,
you know not necessarily bylaws, in their institutional wisdom wanted to
bring diversity to the board. (Resp16, M)
The female participant’s quote below indicates evidence of legitimacy (e.g., “we
are a bunch of old white men, we are about to go public and we are too embarrassed to
show up as we are, we need some diversity”), tokenism (e.g., “I was the only woman on
the board for four years”), as well as unconscious bias and stereotypes (e.g., “It was an
amazingly sexist interview. The person who interviewed me said it was too bad I decided
not to have children...They said we are really glad you are here, we wouldn’t have
thought of that and they wouldn’t, they were clueless”). The full quote is found below:
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It also meant I got a call one day asking me to consider joining the board.
They literally said we are a bunch of old white men, we are about to go
public and we are too embarrassed to show up as we are, we need some
diversity. They got my name from a couple of [directors]. It was an
amazingly sexist interview. The person who interviewed me said it was too
bad I decided not to have children. I remember saying, my son would be
very upset with this conversation. He said, oh, it wasn’t on your resume. I
said some people don’t put it on their resume. He had been actively
involved in the bank but he didn’t do a lot of other external things. I ended
up getting on that board, but I was really wondering if I really wanted to
do this. These people seemed to be in the dark ages. I was worried that the
[company] would be sued because of his questions to me. I only agreed to
go on the board if in fact they would put training into the professionals
who would be interviewing people. Because, I said to this guy you can’t
say things to people like that. He said, I can say anything I want. I said no,
you can’t. They then said we really need you, because we wouldn’t even
know stuff like that. We wouldn’t know how to change policies. It actually
turned out to be a terrific experience for me. And I think it was really
helpful for them, they had all these policies for the [company] and they
wanted everyone to approve them, I said they assume there are only men
in the world. Because they said he this, he that, I said any intelligent
woman in the world with money who read these, will not come to your
[company] because you are ignoring them. And this is the 90s, you can’t
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ignore them. And they were great, they said they would change all the
policies in the [company]. They said we are really glad you are here, we
wouldn’t have thought of that and they wouldn’t, they were clueless. That
was in the ‘90s, and that was my first board. I was the only woman on the
board for four years. (Resp10, F)
As the quote above and other findings are beginning to demonstrate, at least as
important to the reasons why boards appoint female directors are reasons why they avoid
appointing female directors. The section that follows presents additional findings from
interviewees’ experiences related to barriers to women’s selection.
Barriers to female director selection: Unconscious bias, “good ol’ boy”
networks, stereotypes, and the “mirror effect”
As literature review findings overwhelmingly indicate, the progress of female
advancement to senior positions in organizations has been slow. More specifically, and
intimately related to the purposes of this qualitative research study, the number of women
directors in corporate America has not improved as much as some researchers had hoped
it would, despite positive signs of progress in the last year. Research findings indicate
that Boards avoid appointing female directors for three main reasons: Firstly, they avoid
appointing female directors without even realizing that they are (unconscious bias). For
example, evidence shows that many male directors are part of “Good Ol’ Boy” networks,
that is, “exclusive” board member networks encompassing all white men that have been
historically excluding women from entry. Secondly, Boards avoid appointing female
members because of stereotypes. Thirdly, the “mirror effect,” as described in a
participant’s earlier account and further explained below, keeps Boards from appointing
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more female directors. Data below illustrate each of the three reasons why Boards avoid
appointing female directors.
Good ol’ boy networks and unconscious bias. Data from respondents’ board
experiences reveal the presence of unconscious bias in the decision-making process
regarding director selection, particularly as it relates to women. As many directors attest,
actions and decisions that exclude females from the boardrooms are often unconscious.
For example, two female directors explain succinctly:
I think there is still a lot of unconscious bias, some of it is they don’t
recognize that some of the things they are still thinking and doing is still
holding women back, because they don’t intend that to be the case.
(Resp2, F)
Really nice men don’t even know they have unconscious bias. (Resp1, F)
Such biases are entrenched in our society and culture. As a female director states:
“The world is a biased place. Whether it is in your house, community, church, there is
bias everywhere, it is just like water to a fish. When you talk to Caucasians and they say I
am not racist, they are lacking self-awareness, there is this unconscious bias that they
don’t even know that they have.” (Resp21, F)
Also evident in the stories is the presence of exclusive networks of usually older,
white males, the so-called “Good Ol’ Boy” networks that prevent or exclude women from
boards because they would rather keep the status quo. Data also indicate, however, that
such actions could in fact be unconscious. Illustrative quotes are found below:
I think men from a specific age group, an older age group, came through
the corporate world in a different era. And while the world has changed
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dramatically and they all want their own daughters and granddaughters to
do well, it can be hard for them to picture women at the top. Still. And,
but, it’s unconscious, they don’t even realize they are saying it...Why [do
they do that]? [It] is because it’s just purely experiential; it’s what their
world was like. And you know you kind of look at the world through that
prism. (Resp2, F)
You do have a bit of an old boy’s network, where guys are all playing golf
together and it’s much easier to socialize with one another. And it’s kind
of harder for females to do that as easily as guys do. (Resp16, M)
“The white male leadership is still alive and well in America.” (Resp1, F)
Women supporting women is critical as men have supported men in the
past. I think there just needs to be more qualified women candidates who
will be championed by women on boards, that’s the way it works. (Resp11,
M)
Because business is based on men and change occurs slowly. And the
status quo is a very comfortable place to be and I think men are still afraid
of women and having them on. And also, I think it’s a really interesting
private club to descend. You know, if we think about inequality and, you
know, the inequality of women and salary and everything else, boards –
not matter how much work they take and how much time they take – being
a board member is still a significant perk. You get stock. You get
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compensation. You work hard, but it’s not a full-time job and I think it’s
still one of the last preserves of men “wearing the pants.” (Resp34, F)
If you look at the people I interact with in business, I would say 75% of
them are men. And when if a board is trying to figure out who they are
going to add a director and they are all males what is the probability they
are going to have another male? It is pretty simple I think. And if you
don’t have the opportunity to interact on the business level with other
females, or females, I think you are unlikely to say, wouldn’t it be great to
have a female on the board. (Resp27, M)
I think for certain the good old boys – they’re new old boys. And I would
really say that Bill Gates and those guys are the new old boys, but I don’t
think it’s the same. I think they’re much more socially conscious – became
that way – than the old boys – the guys on the boards that I’ve been on
have been much more open than the old guard. I think there still is a series
of people who have a whole lot of money, have powerful corporations, and
still have disproportionate say in the direction of the country and the
country’s economy. (Resp33, M)
Stereotypes and other barriers. While some findings overwhelmingly indicate
that unconscious bias often underlies decisions to exclude or avoid selecting female
directors, other evidence points to the presence of stereotypes and other barriers that keep
women from being selected for directorships. As a male director states, “There are words
to describe the behavior of a man [but] similar behavior of a woman is described in
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different terms. A man will be aggressive, a woman’s pushy. It is just these words,
characterization, that make it difficult for women to break through any glass ceiling”
(Resp13, M). In breaking through these barriers, many participants explain that the role
of their first directorship had been instrumental. For example, a female director explains
how she realized that after she was appointed on her first board she became highly sought
after for subsequent board positions. In reaching her first board membership, she had
already overcome at least some stereotypes associated with being a WOB and that
opened up the doors for subsequent opportunities:
One of the things that I learned several years later is that once you’ve
served on one corporate board, it makes you a prime candidate for
subsequent boards, you’ve proved yourself. It’s one of those kind of
halleluiah moments when you realize, geez, now that I’ve been on a board
for four-five years, others may come and knocking on the door, which is
what happened to me...Once you are on a corporate board it becomes
easier to get that second or third corporate board. (Resp2, F)
Director experiences also indicate that often women need to have more degrees or
demonstrated qualifications than their male counterparts to be considered qualified
enough for director positions:
I worked really hard and I was always willing to do things. I never turned
anything down. I went above and beyond and went the extra mile. The first
job I ever had I was the most qualified person there and everyone else
there was a male, I had two degrees and none of them did. (Resp7, F)
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Being number one in my class was helpful. Being determined to do well. I
thought I am doing well in school, I am good in math, I am smart, I will
show them, doing a good job. Later to be on boards they could see I had a
good career, I was a [top management position]. I was the first
[European] woman, and one of the very few women, to [have this
position] at [US company], so I think the men were impressed I had made
it in a man’s world. So, that helped me get on boards. (Resp5, F)
A female’s first directorial position is a signal of success, business expertise and
status, and it increases visibility, all of which may reduce the perceived lack of fit
between women’s abilities and qualifications, and those deemed necessary for success as
a director, thus mitigating the effect of stereotypes and other barriers for women. As data
above reveal, this is what several female respondents had experienced in their career as
directors.
The mirror effect. Overwhelming evidence indicates that another reason why
Boards avoid appointing female directors is the “mirror effect,” as introduced earlier in
this work (section “Who Boards Look for”). As board members look for other members
who look just like them, i.e. the “mirror effect,” females are automatically excluded from
boardrooms, since most directors in corporate America are currently males. As several
respondents state:
That’s another reason why it’s been hard for women to break in: We don’t
look like all the guys from the corner suite, or on the boards...It’s funny
because everybody wants more women and people of color on boards, and
then you find this kind of quandary, this contradiction if you will, between
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we want so badly to find some great women and people of color to be on
our board and then you tend to think of candidates who, again, aren’t
those people, who look just like you and who you’ve had more experience
working with, because our numbers have been so limited in these
positions. It’s a Catch 22, it’s a Catch 22 for women [] that’s slowly
breaking down, but I think it helps to explain why the progress has been so
slow. (Resp2, F)
I think people don’t understand diversity. I don’t think there is any reason
for it and you can’t convince them. When a woman is up for promotion,
when she’s on the hunt, they give her a social pat on the back and say
“these are good points…but how about John Jones?” How you look is
important and human comfort level is instrumental. No matter what your
background is, people are comfortable with people like them. Successful
people who look like them validates that person. (Resp1, F)
Men have their own way to communicate, and they know they are more
comfortable with other men. They share the bathroom, the golf club, and
they tend to push for people they are comfortable with. And they are not as
comfortable with women. People wanna be around people that they feel
comfortable with, not people that they feel uncomfortable with. And that's
people like them! And so until that is challenged by saying, you will be a
better leader if you learn to work along people that you are uncomfortable
with, and learn to be comfortable with them and see the benefits; until that
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happens, it's unsustainable. Any kind of advantage will be unsustainable
in the market. (Resp5, F)
Getting somebody whose name is known sitting on your board seems to be
a part of the selection process. That’s generally a board that basically will
not have a lot of challenges for the management team. That kind of
culture; boards sitting there looking for people like themselves. They are
seeing if people will fit on that type of board...I’m not sure, I guess it is
human nature to tend to choose people who are like us. (Resp11, M)
I think to the extent that there are boards with no women, I think it rather
speaks to the fact that the men who are in the positions of power on
boards, whether it’s the CEO, or CFO or chairman, they may be more
comfortable having other people just like them on the board and surround
themselves with people like them, because they think these are the people I
know who can perform in the same way I do. They are the people I want to
surround myself with. (Resp7, F)
Diversity awareness and efforts. Data overwhelmingly indicate that gender
diversity is not at the forefront of people’s minds in the boardroom. As participants state:
I suggested that there be a woman on the board. And I think that, the
owner, it is a relatively small company, the owner is interested in having a
variety of people on the board, but when he looks at a specific skill set, he
doesn’t know any females that fit that those skills set. And so, I think in the
majority of cases very few boards think wouldn’t it be nice to have women
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on our board? It is one of those things that if you said to them wouldn’t it
be nice to have women on the board: that is a good idea. It is not
something they think of on their own, generally. (Resp13, F)
They still don’t get the value of gender diversity. When it’s there they
don’t understand the value of it, and when it’s not they don’t understand
or know what’s missing. (Resp1, F)
3.2.3. Summary
This section examined why women may get selected or overlooked for director
positions. Findings indicate that on the one hand, Boards appoint female directors to
attract, retain and inspire female talent in their organizations; to diversify opinions and
skillsets in their boardrooms; and to gain legitimacy. On the other, they avoid appointing
female directors because of unconscious bias, stereotypes, and the (male) directors’
tendency to select individuals who look just like them, which keeps them in their comfort
zones. The next section is a discussion on how these findings inform the theory of the
problem of women’s persistent underrepresentation on corporate boards and how they
relate to prior research. Finally, it considers implications for theory and practice,
limitations and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The current literature that addresses the lack of gender diversity on boards focuses
largely on director demographics over time, and firm and board performance. At the
same time, despite 50 years of research, corporate boards remain largely male-dominant
and the progress for WOB remains slow. These outcomes suggest the need for analyses
that draw input directly from board members, as well as further theoretical development.
This dissertation contributes to the literature and practice by examining both male and
female director perspectives using a qualitative interview approach to better understand
how and why corporate boards appoint members, and in particular female members. It
enhances our understanding of the often elusive board appointment process by providing
a framework, based on respondent experiences, that best describes this secretive process.
This research also advances theory on the persistent underrepresentation of WOB by
shedding light on the reasons why boards select – or avoid selecting – female directors,
with important implications for research and practice.
According to the current literature, beyond the merits of the fairness argument
(Adams, 2015a), many researchers have made the business case for the benefits of gender
diversity in the boardroom (e.g. Flynn & Adams, 2004; Kanter, 1987; Wolfman, 2007).
More specifically, scholars have focused on how gender diversity on boards affects firm
financial performance, albeit with mixed conclusions (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009;
Adams & Flynn, 2005; Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay, & Zhao, 2011; Carter, D’Souza,
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Li et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2019; Wolfman, 2007). There is
perhaps more clear-cut evidence that greater representation of women in leadership
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positions in general, and women directors in particular, can have positive effects on
overall firm reputation (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2013) and corporate social
performance (e.g., Miller & del Carmen Triana, 2009; Wahid, 2019), even though this
may have historically been leading companies to appoint females as tokens to help
increase legitimacy (Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002) and “check off” the box for
diversity (see Acker & Van Houten, 1974; Morrison, White, & Van Velsor, 1987).
My qualitative research findings confirm that female directors are selected for
strategic reasons (e.g., to enhance reputation and attract female talent throughout the
company ranks), as well as for political reasons (e.g., to increase legitimacy). Findings
also reveal some evidence of tokenism, especially in directors’ earlier careers, which are
consistent with the extant literature. As a male participant specifically describes: “There
is no question that some of these public company boards will seek out a woman just so
they can say they have a woman on the board, like a token kind of thing...So, you know,
they may want somebody who has a prestigious position, but they may not want her so
much for her skillset, it's just her prestigious position and the fact that she is a woman”
(Resp4, M). Findings also overwhelmingly reveal that women’s contributions to boards
are unique and valuable, and that gender diverse boards are more effective, which results
in better performance. More specifically, evidence reveals that women: (a) tend to be
more qualitative and have softer skills--better people skills, and tend to care about
environmental and societal issues to a greater extent; (b) tend to be better prepared for
board meetings than their male counterparts and take this responsibility very seriously;
(c) tend to be more open to considering several different alternatives and weigh several
different aspects before taking a decision. However, men tend to be more confident in the
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way that they present themselves, as well as more aggressive and demanding of the
company management, which is not always beneficial.
The current literature and this dissertation’s qualitative interview findings, both
show that discrimination and stereotypes have hindered – and continue to hinder –
women’s

advancement (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Crampton & Mishra, 1999;

Fogliasso & Scales, 2011; Guldiken et al., 2019; Hodigere & Bilimoria, 2015; Oakley,
2000; Schwartz, 1992), proving that these are indeed deeply rooted and resistant to
change (Caleo & Heilman, 2014; Heilman, 2001; Heilman, Block, Martell, & Simon,
1989). Such barriers may manifest in the boardroom in the form of unconscious bias, the
“queen bee” syndrome, entrenched boards, the “mirror effect,” and “Good Ol’ Boy”
networks. Human capital theory (Becker, 1964) examines the role of an individual’s
cumulative stocks of education, skills and experience in enhancing cognitive and
productive capabilities which benefit the individual and his/her organization (Terjesen et
al., 2009). Looking at career paths and skillsets through the lens of human capital theory,
these can be measured as, for example, number of years of education, advanced degrees,
years and type of work experience, and types of leadership positions held throughout the
director’s career (Withers et al., 2012). Directors bring unique human capital to the board
(Kesner, 1988) and individuals must obtain extensive stocks of human capital in order to
be considered for directorships (Kesner, 1988). Occupational differences reflect the
heterogeneity of resources such as expertise, skill, information, and potential linkages to
other external constituencies (Hillman et al., 2002). The logic behind this human capital
experience of directors is that greater diversity of occupational representation on a board
widens the expertise present. This can be understood as assembling a pool of directors
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that maximize the firm’s resources such as expertise, linkages with external contingencies
for communication, and the provision of resources and legitimacy. Thus, from the human
capital experience perspective, one would expect directors to be chosen based on a desire
to widen the board’s resource base via diverse occupational backgrounds (Hillman et al.,
2002) – a finding also supported by this dissertation.
However, the selection process framework developed based on respondents’
experiences (Figure 10) reveals a disconnect between intentions and actual behavior.
Specifically, even though boards often have a specific description of “who they look for”
in terms of skills, abilities, and qualifications, they tend to nominate directors that “look
just like them” because they believe they will be a good “cultural fit” (e.g., form trusting
relationships) with the rest of the board, even if the nominee may not directly match the
initial ideal candidate description. Networks and relationships with directors and senior
management are instrumental in this process and are conceptualized as a filter for
candidate directors in the selection process. Findings indicate that candidates have to
clear this network/relationships filter, and even if the selected director lacks some
preconceived desired skills, they are still more likely to get selected if they have cleared
this filter, as fit seems to be most important.
Status characteristics theory asserts that for low-status groups (such as women),
standards of ability are higher than for high-status group members (such as men). That is,
to be perceived as being adequately able, a woman has to demonstrate stronger evidence
of ability than her male counterpart (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Foschi, 1992; Eagly
& Karau, 2002). This theory echoes the “twice as good to be considered half as good”
sentiment expressed by many females anecdotally (Hillman et al., 2002). As van Esch,
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Hopkins, O'Neil, & Bilimoria (2018) assert, female candidates who have not yet proven
themselves to be highly qualified are perceived as riskier for leadership positions, and are
significantly less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates. Thus, for
females, standards of achievement may be higher than for males; again, pointing to an
expectation that females should signal relatively higher ability to be selected (e.g., higher
levels of education and/or a previous successful board appointment). Consistent with
status characteristics theory, Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997) find in their study that
when a question was framed in terms of making an ability inference, participants required
significantly more skill from a female than a male applicant. Thus, status characteristics
theory points to an increased need for females to exhibit high levels of ability in order to
be judged as competent as males with lower levels of ability (Hillman et al., 2002). In a
critical and competence-related position, such as that of director in a corporate board, it
may even be more crucial for females to adequately document their capabilities and
performance. Whether accurate or not, women have long been considered “outsiders” in
the business world (Hillman et al., 2002). By obtaining advanced degrees or providing
evidence of high performance, women hold tangible evidence of expertise,
accomplishment, and social standing; thus, such performance measures may be a key
component to overcoming this outsider or “lack of fit” status, and the surest path to
meeting the higher standards of ability set for them. For example, through education,
women may demonstrate credibility as potential directors (Hillman et al., 2002).
Qualitative research findings from this dissertation confirm that males may need to do
well to signal high ability, but females must do better to signal the same level of ability
(cf. Foddy & Smithson, 1989).
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As explained earlier, the queen bee syndrome refers to the phenomenon whereby
female tokens often prefer to be highly distinct members in their work groups and are
biased against other women (Cooper, 1997; Staines, Tavris, & Jayaratne, 1974). For
example, Kanter (1987) noted that female tokens actively worked to keep other women
from entering their work group. Moreover, Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass,
and Bonvini (2004) showed that under represented female faculty members often held
more stereotypically negative views of the work commitment of female compared to
male Ph.D. students. In comparison, “Good Ol’ Boy” networks refer to “exclusive”
networks of usually older, white males that prevent or exclude women because they
would rather keep things the way “things used to be” (cf. Simon & Warner, 1992; Tilly,
1999; Terjesen et al., 2009). Lastly, the “mirror effect” refers to how predominantly
older, white male directors tend to appoint people who “look just like them.” In contrast
to a number of published studies, qualitative research findings show no evidence of the
queen bee syndrome, lack of board access to female talent (e.g., supply-side factors
keeping women back), or an inability or unwillingness of boards to incur the costs of
finding female candidates. Results overwhelmingly suggest that it is unconscious bias,
stereotypes, “Good Ol’ Boy” networks and the “mirror effect” that play a major role in
keeping women from corporate boards.
Further, findings provide useful insights on the gap in knowledge regarding the
effects of board member networks on director selection (cf. Hodigere & Bilimoria, 2015).
For example, Hodigere and Bilimoria (2015) find that while men’s human capital and
professional network characteristics almost fully explain their selection to corporate
boards, only certain characteristics of a woman’s professional network highly impact her
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chances of being appointed to a corporate board. These findings are consistent with this
dissertation’s qualitative research findings regarding the importance of director networks
for board appointments. They are also consistent with the findings that relate to continued
bias and discrimination in the appointment process. My findings suggest that networking
may be the most effective tool against such biases and stereotypes, as it appears to
enhance a female candidate’s legitimacy and the perception of “cultural fit” in the eyes of
male counterparts (Vasiliou & Adams, 2018).
Networking is also relevant to the abovementioned disconnect whereby in the
formal director selection process, boards provide search firms with specific descriptions
of potential candidates but then proceed to appoint board members based on cultural fit.
Results of the current dissertation allude to the effectiveness of networking as a “mirror
effect” mitigation tool whereby male board members become more familiar with female
candidates over time, thus viewing them as less different from themselves. Networking,
that is, appears to build trust between current board members and potential female
candidates, where the former do not feel that female newcomers might challenge longheld alliances or support for company management (without good reason).
Consistent with recent research reports regarding GDOB (see Spencer Stuart,
2019), I find that continued low boardroom turnover remains a persistent impediment to
meaningful year-over-year change in the overall board composition. Further, findings
related to gender biases help explain why a lot of the gains for women directors,
especially over the past year, are through the additions of board seats rather than the
replacement of their male counterparts (cf. Emelianova & Milhomem, 2019; Knippen et
al., 2019; Spencer Stuart, 2019; Tinsley, Wade, Main, & O’Reilly, 2017).
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However, practitioners and female candidate directors should consider that, as
findings indicate, some boards seem to be embarrassed by the lack of WOB and seem to
value GDOB. It appears to be mostly psychological barriers that need to be overcome—
barriers unconsciously imposed by incumbents, leading to the abovementioned biases and
deeply held stereotypes, which appear to still be as prevalent as indicated in earlier
studies (see, for example, Prime, 2005). This further suggests the significance of
networking as a tool for mitigating such barriers. Thus, women should not rely on
traditional job search processes. Instead, they should insert themselves in the process and
focus on the following: (a) developing the necessary skills and expertise that boards
might need, (b) finding a sponsor in the higher ranks of relevant organizations, and (c)
networking—especially with people who do not look like them. Additionally, current
female directors and men who genuinely value board gender diversity can facilitate
networking, assist in board preparation, and help women navigate biased territories.
Seeking assistance from people with greater knowledge of the landscape can make a
difference for potential directors (Vasiliou & Adams, 2018).
Research results should be considered in light of several limitations. First,
participants’ responses could be influenced by social desirability bias, self-selection bias,
and/or impression management strategies in responding to interview questions. However,
based on my interview experiences and the rapport built with participants at the
beginning of these interviews, I believe the participants spoke openly and honestly, which
is evidenced in the quotes presented throughout the dissertation. Second, the qualitative
study is focused on the experiences of directors based primarily in the United States.
Future research could build on these findings and benefit from international director
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perspectives, with a special attention given to perhaps cultural differences in decision
making regarding director selection. Third, this research could also benefit from
ethnographic methods and observation of participants in, for example, boardroom
meetings and discussions pertaining to the appointment process of new directors. I do
recognize that it is especially difficult–if not impossible–to be granted such access inside
the walls of a corporate board, particularly in the United States. However, researchers in
the United Kingdom seem to be gaining valuable ground, with ethnographic methods
being seriously considered and under way (Academy of Management Conference, 2018).
At a minimum, this work’s findings suggest a complex and subconscious process
whereby current male directors tend to systematically ignore female candidates and
appoint instead their male counterparts. Results underscore the challenges associated with
increasing corporate board gender diversity and highlight the importance of qualitative
interview methods for direct input from current boards to gain valuable insights on board
appointment processes, with important implications for theory and practice.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1. Women’s representation on boards across the globe, 2019
Country
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
India
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
United
Kingdom
United
States

% Women
Directorships, 2019

% Women
Directorships, 2016

% With Three or
More WOB, 2019

% With 1-2
WOB, 2019

% With Zero
WOB, 2019

Quota and Year
Introduced

31.20%
29.10%
44.30%
33.30%
15.90%
8.40%
34.00%
39.60%
24.90%

26.00%
22.80%
37.60%
19.50%
12.80%
4.80%
18.90%
35.60%
17.50%

58.20%
63.00%
98.60%
81.00%
21.30%
3.40%
65.20%
96.60%
48.80%

40.30%
35.90%
1.40%
17.20%
78.80%
63.20%
34.80%
3.40%
51.20%

1.50%
1.10%
0.00%
1.70%
0.00%
33.40%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

No
Pending
Yes, 2010
Yes, 2015
Yes, 2013
No
Yes, 2013
Yes, 2016
Pending

31.70%

25.30%

82.20%

17.80%

0.00%

No

26.10%

20.30%

56.20%

42.80%

1.00%

CA Only, 2018

Source: Catalyst, 2020
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Figure 2. Global mandates summary for women on boards of public companies,
2019
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Source: MSCI ESG Research, 2019
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Figure 3: Literature review publications by year
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Figure 4: Journals with three or more publications included in the literature review

Note: The number in each box indicates the number of publications included in the
review from each journal.
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Table 1. Women on Corporate Boards: Theories used and Illustrative Publications,
2009 – present
Theory (illustrative article(s) using the theoretical framework)
Agency theory
Key:
 Principal-agent model (Gopalan & Watson, 2015)
(Theory) still
 Directors’ monitoring role and resource provision
in use since
(Guldiken et al., 2019)
Terjesen et
 Socioemotional health (Poletti-Hughes & Briano-Turrent, 2019) al.’s (2009)
review
Board functioning (Wahid, 2019)
Critical mass theory (Fan, Jiang, Zhang, & Zhou, 2019; Joecks, Pull, Vetter, 2013;
Nadeem, 2019; Rossi, Hu, & Foley, 2017; Tleubayev, Bobojonov, Gagalyuk, &
Glauben, 2020; Yang, Yang, & Gao, 2019)
Economic cycle theory (Sun, Zhu, & Ye, 2015)
Emancipation (theory of) (Brieger, Francoeur, Welzel, & Ben-Amar, 2019)
Gatekeeping (Guldiken et al., 2019)
Gender theories
– Gender differences, ethics, characteristics (Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Ilanit, 2012)
– Gender identity (Sayce, 2012)
– Gender socialization theory (Burkhardt, Nguyen, & Poincelot, 2020)
Group effectiveness theories (Nielsen & Huse, 2010)
Goal-setting theory (Mensi-Klarbach, Leixnering, & Schiffinger, 2019)
Homophily principle (Duguid, 2011)
Human capital theory (Sandgren, 2012)
Institutional theory
– Adoption of good governance code recommendations (Mensi-Klarbach,
Leixnering, & Schiffinger, 2019)
– Differences in institutional/cultural settings across countries (Carrasco et al.,
2015; Grosvold, 2011)
– The role of state in the governance of companies (Goyal, Kakabadse, &
Kakabadse, 2018)
– Institutional work (Sheridan et al., 2014)
– Neo-institutional theory (Grosvold, Rayton, & Brammer, 2016)
– Legitimacy
 Organizational (Fondas, 2013)
 Personal -for directors- (Singh, Point, Moulin, & Davila, 2015)
– Institutional complementarities (Iannotta, Gatti, & Huse, 2016)
– Country-level institutions: labor market and culture (Tyrowicz, Terjesen, &
Mazurek, 2020)
– Impact of WoB on CEO pay and pay-performance link (Usman, Farooq, Zhang,
Dong, & Makki, 2019)
Intergroup relations/contact theory; mentoring (McDonald & Westphal, 2013; Guldiken
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et al., 2019)
Managerial power theory (Azam, Khalid, & Zia, 2019)
Optimal contracting theory (Azam et al., 2019)
Optimal distinctiveness theory (Duguid, 2011)
Resource dependency (Aggarwal, Jindal, & Seth, 2019; Duppati et al., 2019; Nadeem,
2019; Tyrowicz, Terjesen, & Mazurek, 2020)
Role congruity theory (Elsesser & Lever, 2011; Fernandez, Burnett, & Gomez, 2019;
Mukarram, Saeed, Hammoudeh, & Raziq, 2018 )
Shareholder theory (Magnier & Rosenblum, 2014)
Signaling Theory (Rowley et al., 2015; Miller & Triana, 2009; Solal & Snellman, 2019)
Similarity-attraction theory (Duguid, 2011)
Social categorization theory (Hodigere & Bilimoria, 2015; Guldiken et al., 2019)
Social identity theory (Abebe & Dadanlar, 2019; Burkhardt, Nguyen, & Poincelot, 2020;
Mathisen, Ogaard, &Mamburg, 2013)
Stakeholder theory (Grosvold, 2011; Magnier & Rosenblum, 2014)
Stewardship theory (Duppati et al., 2019)
Tokenism, solo status theories (Esteban-Salvador, 2011; Guldiken et al., 2019)
Threat-rigidity theory (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013)
Work groups theory (Sun, Zhu, & Ye, 2015)

Figure 5: Literature review articles: Word cloud (larger size indicates more
frequent use)
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Figure 6: Participants’ age (in groups to protect anonymity) by gender
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Figure 7: Participants’ average age by gender
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Figure 8: Participants’ highest education by gender
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Figure 9: Interview transcripts word cloud (larger size indicates more frequent use)
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Table 2. Interview Guide Questions
Can you tell me some of your own experiences about being a director?
How did you first become a director? What has the process been like for other directors
joining the boards you are on?
In your experience, how has the appointment process changed over the years?
In what ways does gender diversity come up in boardroom discussions (if it does)?
When, why?
Why is having a gender diverse board significant, in your opinion?
How do you believe male and female directors differ?
Can you talk about some of the factors that have impacted the advancement of your own
career?
Tell me about the relationship between your work and family or personal life.
Why do you think there are so few women in top leadership positions, such as corporate
directors or CEOs?
What advice would you give to women aspiring to reach such top leadership positions?
What do we need to do to put more women on boards?
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Figure 10: The appointment process model at the board level, after a director need has been established.
The director selection process

*TMT is top management team
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APPENDIX A: E-mail Invitation to Participate in the Interview Study
RE: Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards Research/Request for an interview
This is an invitation to participate in an interview which is part of an important
research study addressing the process through which decisions are made for the
appointment of new directors to corporate boards.
This research will explore the process through which decisions are made for the
appointment of new directors to corporate boards, and in particular female directors. A
focus of this study will be on the experiences of both male and female directors. This
study is purely academic in orientation, but can also provide a basis for change toward
more effective and equitable gender representation on boards. Your thoughts and
experiences are critical for this research.
I hope to meet or talk by phone at your convenience anytime over the next couple of
weeks. Our interview will take approximately 45 minutes. If you have any questions or
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time.
Please note that this study is part of the PhD Program in Business at Bentley University. I
will be happy to provide you with a copy of my report once it is completed.
To schedule a time that is convenient for you please contact me directly at
vvasiliou@bentley.edu.
Thank you very much for considering your participation in this study.

Sincerely,
Vasilia Vasiliou
[address]
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APPENDIX B: Informed Consent Letter for Participants
Date
Name of subject
Address of subject
Dear _________,
Thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed. I am conducting research on how
and why directors in general, and female directors in particular, are appointed on
corporate boards. A focus of this study will be on how boards decide to appoint female
members and the reasons why they decide to do so, in the manner and to the extent that
they do. The study will address an understudied area of research and also contribute
significantly to practice by providing insights into the processes and decision making of
corporate boards. The study, thus, will be an important tool, not only for academic
contributions, but also to provide basis for change for a more effective and equitable
gender representation on boards.
Our interview will take approximately thirty to forty-five minutes. I will ask for your
opinions regarding the need for female directors on boards, the processes by which
directors are appointed, and in particular female directors, and the reasons why you
believe that they are being appointed. Your participation is strictly voluntary, and you
may withdraw your permission to participate in this study at any time without penalty. I
will be happy to provide you with a copy of my report regardless of whether you are able
to answer any or all questions in our interview.
I will be the only person with access to the notes I take from this interview. All materials
arising from this interview will be stored in a locked cabinet in an office to which only I
have access to. My final report will present only summarized findings. The information
you provide will not be attributed back to either you or your company unless you provide
a specific permission. In order to improve accuracy, I would like to ask your permission
to audiotape this interview. Please let me know at the time of our meeting if I may have
your permission for taping. If not, I will simply rely on notes taken during the interview.
Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowable by law.
If you have any questions about this project please do not hesitate to contact me at the
address provided below. Questions pertaining to your rights as a subject in this study may
be addressed to Bentley University’s Institutional Review Board Administrator, Mary
Louise Pauli, at 175 Forest Street, Waltham, Massachusetts 02452, or
mpauli@bentley.edu, or 781-891-2660.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely,
Vasilia Vasiliou
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